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Abstract  
This master thesis builds on previous research by Argyres and Mayer (2007). 
They argue that a firm´s ability and capacity to perform tasks related to 
contractual work can be defined as contracting capabilities. These capabilities 
are a competitive advantage for firms and can enhance their performance.  
 
To my knowledge, no empirical studies on contracting capabilities are conducted 
with an attempt to measure a firm’s contracting capabilities.  Research on how 
contracting capabilities can be developed is also limited. I therefore aim to fill 
this gap by investigating how contracting capabilities can be measured and 
developed. I also seek to examine the impact firm characteristics have on 
companies level of contracting capabilities. Additionally, I will investigate how 
contracting capabilities influence firm performance.  
 
This study has a quantitative approach in which key respondents were located by 
phone. The key respondents received an online questionnaire. Out of 147 
Norwegian based export companies that agreed to participate in the study, I 
received 76 responses.  
 
The results show that contracting capabilities can be measured along four 
dimensions; term specification and writing, contract adaptation, internal 
organizing and relationship development and maintenance. Experience is 
positively associated with firms’ contracting capabilities. Contrary to my 
predictions, resource slack, age of firm, size of firm, internal consult, external 
consult and training shows no significant relationship with contracting 
capabilities.  
 
Out of the four identified dimensions of contracting capabilities, the results show 
a positive relationship between internal organizing and firm performance. The 
other dimensions do not receive support. Depending on the way firms adapt their 
contractual activities to their organization and allocate human resources, 
contracting capabilities can be developed and enhance companies´ performance. 
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1. Introduction 
Companies operate in a continuously more globalized world and engage in trade 
relationships across cultures and nation boarders like never before (Brown and 
Eisenhardt 1998). Independent of the geographical dispersion of firms’ 
activities, they are still subject to a changing business environment with 
increased competition and risk. Consequently, firms face new requirements to 
succeed with their activities and transactions. 
 
Transaction costs economics (TCE) is central in academic circles with its 
perspective for understanding business-to-business relationships (Sande and 
Haugland 2013). This theory predicts that firms are exposed to potential harmful 
hazards when they engage in trade relationships (Mooi and Ghosh 2010). Most 
attention is given to hazards related to hold-up problems with relationship 
specific investments, uncertainty, and measurement ambiguity (Poppo and 
Zenger 2002; Williamson 1985; Anderson and Gatignon 1986; Ghosh and John 
1999; Klein, Crawford and Alchian 1978). Firms seek to avoid such situations. 
The primary recommendation derived from TCE is to apply governance 
mechanisms to safeguard against these hazards (Mooi and Ghosh 2010).  
 
Formal contracts can be applied to govern relationships with transaction partners 
(Mooi and Ghosh 2010; Lusch and Brown 1996). They are legally binding and 
enforceable agreements between two or more parties, and have to be voluntary 
and deliberate by the partners (Masten 1999). Formal contracts function as a 
value adding mechanism by reducing risk and uncertainty in exchange 
relationships (Lusch and Brown 1996).  
 
Problems related to transactions can be mitigated through the use of formal 
contracts. Problems are prevented because roles, responsibilities, terms and 
conditions established in a written contract prior to the transaction. This implies 
that obligations are made during contract negotiations and are legally binding. 
This can reduce misunderstandings and prevent the counterparty from acting 
opportunistically (Wathne and Heide 2000). Further, formal contracts are 
   GRA 19003 Master Thesis 
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protective because contingency planning and dispute resolution clauses provide 
security in case of contractual breaches.  
 
In this thesis I build on previous research by Argyres and Mayer (2007) on how 
formal written contracts can be managed to enhance business performance. The 
authors define contracting capabilities as a firms´ ability and capacity to perform 
certain tasks related to designing formal contracts, and aligning contract terms 
with transaction attributes. They further suggest that allocating resources with 
the appropriate knowledge to the right contracting term is key in the contracting 
process (Argyres and Mayer 2007). The basis of the article is a related paper by 
Mayer and Argyres (2004), who find that contracting is a learning process and a 
way to manage inter-firm relationships over time.  
 
Although I agree with the definition suggested by Argyres and Mayer (2007), I 
still find it insufficient to describe the full extent of this concept. I argue that 
contracting capabilities involves more than just the design of contracts, but 
contracting as a process e.g. negotiation of contract terms (Weber and Mayer 
2005) and contract enforcement (Rigault 2010). I wish to supplement the 
definition by Argyres and Mayer (2007) with the inclusion of activities related to 
the contracting process as a whole. I therefore propose my own definition of 
contracting capabilities as:  
 
“a firms ability and capacity to perform tasks and activities related to 
negotiating, writing, and enforcing formal written contracts, with the objective 
of governing their resources and transactions to enhance relationship 
performance.” 
 
The concept of contracting capabilities is discussed in the contracting literature. 
However, it still remains relatively unexplored. To my knowledge, no empirical 
studies are conducted on contracting capabilities in a broader sense with an 
attempt to measure a firms contracting capabilities or research how they can be 
developed. This implies that no measures on contracting capabilities are 
currently available.  
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I was also unable to find empirical examination of how firm characteristics 
influence contracting capabilities, as the literature focuses on transaction 
attributes. The performance implications of contracting capabilities are 
perceived to be positive, but this relationship is not empirically tested. I argue 
that the topic of contracting capabilities deserves attention. Especially based on 
the significance of its implications and the large extent of firms it affects. In this 
master thesis I will therefore further explore this construct. This leads me to my 
problem statement. 
 
1.1. Problem Statement and Research Questions 
In this master thesis I seek to contribute to the contracting literature by 
investigating some aspects of contracting capabilities. I have formulated the 
following problem statement: 
 
How can contracting capabilities be measured and developed, and how do they 
impact firm performance in B2B relationships? 
 
This has lead me to the formulation of four research questions: 
 
Research Question 1: How can contracting capabilities be measured? 
Research Question 2:  How can firms develop contracting capabilities? 
Research Question 3:  How does firm characteristics influence companies 
contracting capabilities? 
Research Question 4:  How does contracting capabilities influence firm 
performance in business-to-business relationships? 
 
By investigating these relationships I attempt to identify what tasks and activities 
firms need to manage to develop contracting capabilities. I also attempt to 
investigate if firm characteristics influence companies contracting capabilities. 
Finally, I seek to investigate if contracting capabilities enhance firm 
performance. Since these relationships have not been examined before, this 
thesis provides new insight to an important aspect of transaction and relationship 
governance. The results are also useful for further development of contractual 
work. 
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1.2. The Research Model 
To answer the research questions I have developed a research model (figure 1.1). 
The model is based on an extension of existing research on contracting 
capabilities (Argyres and Mayer 2007; Mayer and Argyres 2004; Weber and 
Mayer 2005).  
 
 
Figure 1.1: The Research Model 
 
I want to examine the relationship between some firm characteristics as control 
variables and contracting capabilities. The firm characteristics applied in this 
thesis are: resource slack, experience, age of firm, size of firm, internal consult, 
external consult and training. Further, I want to analyze the relationship between 
contracting capabilities as an independent variable and firm performance as the 
dependent variable. The latter measured as economic export performance and 
customer export performance.  
 
Resource 
Slack 
Experience 
Age of Firm 
Size of Firm 
Internal Consult 
External Consult 
Training 
Contracting 
Capabilities Firm Performance 
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The rest of this thesis is organized as follows: First, I will provide a theoretical 
background of formal contracts and agreements. Thereafter, three antecedents to 
formal contracts are presented, namely relationship specific investments, 
uncertainty and measurement ambiguity. This is followed by a theoretical 
discussion of contracting capabilities and research hypotheses. A description of 
the methods used is provided prior to conducting a confirmatory factor analysis 
and regression analysis. Results are then presented and answers to research 
questions discussed. Last, I will provide some theoretical contributions and 
managerial implications, limitations, and suggestions for future research.   
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2. Theoretical Background  
In this chapter the theoretical background for the master thesis is provided.  
First, I will examine different perspectives on formal contracts. Thereafter, a 
presentation is given of antecedents to formal contracts and contractual hazards 
that can affect the contractual outcome. Last, contracting capabilities and 
associated dimensions are discussed. 
  
 2.1. Formal Contracts 
In this section I will define formal contracts and present the rational companies 
have for entering formal written contracts. I will discuss the relationship 
between formal contracts and trust, types of contracts and the role of formal 
contracts for firms. Finally, I present some dimensions included in most written 
contracts. 
 
“Formal contracts represent promises or obligations to perform particular actions 
in the future” (Macneil 1978). “A contract, at its most basic level, is a legally 
enforceable agreement” (Masten 1999, 25). More specifically, it is a legally 
binding and enforceable agreement between two or more parties and has to be 
voluntarily and deliberate by the partners (Masten 1999).  
 
Contracts are usually written, and set to project into the future. They thus 
function as a governance mechanism used for transactions and in exchange 
relationships to reduce risk and uncertainty firms may encounter (Lusch and 
Brown 1996; Mooi and Ghosh 2010).  
 
The basic motivation for companies to enter into contracts is to secure 
commitment to the relationship from the different parties (Masten 1999). 
Without this commitment firms may be reluctant to make investments or adjust 
their operations to realize the full value of exchange. In addition to commitment, 
three other factors are perceived to motivate firms to apply formal contracts in 
exchange relationships; risk transfer, incentive alignment and transaction cost 
economizing. Masten (1999) The design and interpretation of formal contracts 
depend on which of these three motives dominates. 
   GRA 19003 Master Thesis 
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By formalizing relationships through contracting, risk can be transferred to the 
more risk adverse partner. It can also ensure that the partners have the same 
incentives to maximize common interests (Masten 1999). The general 
understanding of transaction cost economics (TCE) is that the characteristics of 
transactions translate into exchange hazards (Mellewigt, Madhok and Weibel 
2007). An exchange hazard is a potential threat that could damage or interrupt 
transactions and relationships. When these hazards increase so must contractual 
safeguards (Williamson 1985; Klein, Crawford and Alchian 1978; Poppo and 
Zenger 2002).  
 
A more complex contract often includes several specifications of promises and 
obligations (Poppo and Zenger 2002). This often includes details on roles and 
responsibilities, delivery- and payment terms, penalties for non-compliance, 
monitoring procedures, information sharing, and performance outcomes (Poppo 
and Zenger 2002). Complex contracts can thus minimize performance losses and 
costs arising from exchange hazards (Macneil 1978; Heide 1994; Poppo and 
Zenger 2002).  
 
On the other hand, contracting can be an expensive process and the associated 
costs will often increase with the level of complexity. Firms only enter into 
contracts and undertake associated costs if the consequences of contractual 
breach are considerable (Poppo and Zenger 2002). The detail level and 
complexity of contracts are therefore determined by the cost of governance and 
the possibilities of opportunistic behavior (Mooi and Ghosh 2010). In other 
words, firms face a trade-off between ex-ante setup and design costs, and ex-
post costs related to contractual breach (Mooi and Ghosh 2010).  
 
The main goal for firms when designing contracts lies in aligning details and 
specifications to transaction attributes, thus to reach the optimal level of 
safeguarding (Mooi and Ghosh 2010). This ability is viewed as a competitive 
advantage for firms (Argyres and Mayer 2007; Weber and Mayer 2005). This is 
also in line with TCE, which emphasizes the influence transaction characteristics 
have on governance decisions (Argyres and Mayer 2007; Mayer and Salomon 
2006). 
   GRA 19003 Master Thesis 
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2.1.1. Formal Contracts and Trust 
A question in the choice of whether to establish a contract is if formal 
contracting is the only option to govern transactions. Williamson (1996) argues 
that complete contracts do not exist due to bounded rationality. Simon (1957, 
198 in Williamson 1996, 36) defines the principle of bounded rationality as 
follows: “The capacity of the human mind for formulating and solving complex 
problems is very small compared with the size of the problems whose solution is 
required for objectively rational behavior in the real world”.  In other words, the 
human mind is rational, but limited so (Williamson 1996). Because of this, not 
all contingencies can be foreseen so contracts are unavoidable incomplete 
(Williamson 1996). This emphasizes the need for additional mechanisms to 
govern transactions and relationships.  
 
Relational governance based on trust and commitment is an alternative. 
“Relational trust is the perceived ability and willingness of the other party to 
behave in ways that considers the interests of both parties in the relationships” 
(Selnes and Sallis 2003, 84). In many cases, the role of trust in relationships is 
perceived to reduce the need for complex detailed contracts (Mellewigt, Madhok 
and Weibel 2007).   
 
In the literature, however, there seems to be lacking a consensus of the 
relationship between trust and formal contracts. Several authors have discussed 
whether trust and relational mechanisms work as substitutes (Macaulay 1963; 
Gulati 1995) or complements (Poppo and Zenger 2002; Uzzi 1997) to formal 
contracting.  
 
In the first case, with formal contracts and trust as substitutes, partners see 
introduction of formal contracts as a lack of trust and damaging to the 
relationship. Contracts are also viewed as unnecessary if the parties trust each 
other as they already expect that the other will perform its obligations (Mayer 
and Argyres 2004; Malhotra and Murninghan 2002).  
 
In the second case, with formal contracts and trust as complements, the situation 
is viewed differently. Formal contracts can enhance trust as they represent 
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commitment to the relationship (Mayer and Argyres 2004; Poppo and Zenger 
2002). Further, Mellewigt, Madhok and Weibel (2007) argue that some of the 
clauses in formal contracts such as monitoring and information sharing increases 
the transparency in the relationship, and therefore enhance trust.  
 
Although relying entirely on trust might be satisfactory in exchange 
relationships when trust is established, one can argue that the situation is 
different when partners are new to each other. Companies should not undermine 
potential hazards that might interrupt exchange relationships before trust is 
established. The role of formal contracts is thus emphasized. A view reflected in 
this thesis. 
 
 2.1.2. Types of Contracts 
One can distinguish between two types of contracts, explicit or implicit (Lusch 
and Brown 1996). Explicit agreements identify exchange partners and formalize 
a set of terms. They are the foundation of formal contracts (Sande 2007; 
MacLeod and Malcomson 1989), and enforceable by the court of law (Masten 
1999). Implicit contracts are normative and identify a set of mutual expectations 
and understanding of the relationship (Lusch and Brown 1996). In this thesis, I 
examine the role of explicit contracts as governance mechanism.  
 
 2.1.3. The Role of Formal Contracts 
Formal contracts have different functions for firms. In general, they can be 
valuable in structuring and providing guidelines for exchange relationships. 
Formal contracts are part of a broader group of organizational tools and 
functions as a strategic choice variable (Ryall and Sampson 2009). The 
implications on performance are direct and receive consensus among scholars 
(Argyres and Mayer 2007; Mayer and Argyres 2004; Mayer and Salomon 2006; 
Mooi and Ghosh 2010).  
 
The applicability of formal contracts is two-folded. First, formal contracts can be 
preventative. They can be used as a planning tool to extract as much out of the 
relationship as possible and plan for contingencies. Secondly, formal contracts 
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can be protective because they help mitigate problems in case of unforeseen 
events, disagreements, contractual breach or dispute resolution (Argyres and 
Mayer 2007). 
 
 2.1.4. Dimensions of Formal Contracts   
Contracts may contain different terms defined by the exchange partners (for a 
review see Shelanski and Klein 1995). Still, some dimensions are included in the 
majority of formal written contracts (Sande and Haugland 2011). In this thesis I 
will discuss roles and responsibilities, communication and information sharing, 
contingency planning, and dispute resolution. The dimensions are presented in 
the next sections. 
 
2.1.4.1. Roles and Responsibilities 
Roles and responsibilities are a significant part of any written agreement 
(Rigault 2010). Role specification is acknowledged as one of the core 
dimensions in formal contracts (Sande and Haugland 2011; Argyres and Mayer 
2007; Lusch and Brown 1996; Ryall and Sampson 2009). This dimension 
includes which parties are involved, allocation of authority and decision making 
rights, the responsibilities of the parties, and what actions to be performed. 
 
When the partners agree and formalize responsibilities they are more likely to 
fulfill them. (Wathne and Heide 2000; Argyres and Mayer 2007) Crafting more 
detailed clauses regarding role specification might thus reduce potential 
misunderstandings and prevent ambiguity about contractual obligations. 
Formalizing role specification may also be valuable as reference or 
documentation in a conflict situation, if one of the parties does not comply with 
pre-agreed terms.  
 
Firms need to decide how specified terms regarding roles and responsibilities 
should be. A higher level of detail is more protective, but can result in lengthy 
negotiations and inhibit flexibility in a contract (Ghoshal and Moran 1996). 
Argyres and Mayer (2007) argue that specifications should be adapted to 
characteristics of the transaction and relationship between the parties. Bilateral 
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dependency, increased complexity of contracts and lack of monitoring abilities 
are associated with more extensive description of roles and responsibilities. 
(Argyres and Mayer 2007) Determining the right level of detail is challenging, 
but can also enhance contractual performance. 
 
2.1.4.2. Communication and Information Sharing 
Communication and information sharing clauses is set to determine how the 
parties plan to communicate with each other during the transaction. These 
clauses can be vital to execute successful contracts (Argyres and Mayer 2007), 
and for the functioning of relationships (Williamson 1991). 
 
A study by Mayer and Argyres (2004) shows that as firms develop their 
experience with contracts, they include more specifications on who are 
responsible for providing partners with information, and in what form. An 
example is regarding product changes. Alterations in product specifications 
should e.g. come from head engineer on the project to prevent that several 
employees on a project make claims to alter specification without 
communicating with each other.  
 
International trades are often more complicated. Differences in communication 
routines, technology, languages and time zones may call for different 
communication styles between partners. The main goal is to ensure satisfactory 
information exchange, thus differences amongst companies should be taken into 
account when specifying communication clauses.  
 
2.1.4.3. Contingency Planning  
Contingency planning is a way to look into the future and predict possible 
outcomes of a situation in order to prevent undesired results. It “involves 
anticipating and making provisions for problems that may or may not occur 
during the execution of the project” (Argyres and Mayer 2007, 1069). 
Contingency planning is used as a tool by firms to reduce risk of a transaction or 
relationship, which often results in written contract terms.  
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All possible contingencies can however never be predicted (Williamson 1975; 
1985; 1996; Grossman and Hart 1986; Macneil 1980). When designing and 
negotiating contracts, agents are “unable to anticipate all future contingencies 
that could affect the contractual relationship” (Mayer and Argyres 2004, 396). 
Companies are however able to foresee major hazards in the exchange 
relationship and devise contractual structures to mitigate them (Mayer and 
Argyres 2004). Hence the goal is not to predict every outcome, but to foresee 
major threats and protect against them. 
 
Contingency planning is costly, time consuming and requires dedicated 
resources. Too much time spent on planning for unforeseen events can slow 
down the negotiation process. It can also give firms a bad reputation of being too 
bureaucratic, and be harmful to business relationships. (Argyres and Mayer 
2007; Mayer and Argyres 2004) Therefore, firms need to balance their efforts in 
a situation where both “too much and too little” planning has negative 
consequences. Some scholars argue that this is a learning process for firms, 
where experience and previous encountered problems form the foundation for 
new specifications in contracts (Argyres and Mayer 2007; Mayer and Argyres 
2004; Ryall and Sampson 2009). 
 
2.1.4.4. Dispute Resolution 
Despite firms planning and protecting efforts, they sometimes find themselves in 
an unfortunate situation where their partner have not fulfilled their obligations or 
has acted in ways of self-interest. This can be at the cost of the relationship, with 
disagreement or conflict as a consequence. A dimension in contracts is often 
included for such situations (Argyres and Mayer 2007). Dispute resolution is set 
to mitigate problems that have already occurred, and often involves determining 
applicable law, jurisdiction and arbitration clauses (Rigault 2010). Lawyers are 
central for the firm in this process because of their in-depth knowledge about 
legal systems and dispute clauses in contracts (Argyres and Mayer 2007; Weber 
and Mayer 2005).  
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2.2. Antecedents to formal contracting 
Transaction cost economics is central in academic circles with its perspectives 
for understanding business-to-business relationships (Sande and Haugland 
2011). The literature identifies three traits or antecedents to formal contracting, 
namely; asset specificity, uncertainty and measurement ambiguity (Poppo and 
Zenger 2002; Williamson 1985; Anderson and Gatignon 1986; Ghosh and John 
1999; Klein, Crawford and Alchian 1978). The antecedents to formal contracting 
will now be discussed further.  
 
 2.2.1. Asset specificity 
Transaction specific investments occur when a transaction requires dedicated 
investments in physical or human capital (Poppo and Zenger 2002). The concept 
is widely discussed in the literature, and many descriptions are provided. In this 
thesis I follow Williamson’s (1985, 55) definition of asset specificity as: 
“…durable investments that are undertaken in support of particular transactions, 
the opportunity cost of which is much lower in best alternative uses or by 
alternative users should the original transaction be prematurely terminated.” 
Firms are motivated to make such investments, because it can enhance their 
rewards of transactions and relationships (Selnes and Sallis 2003).  
 
Since these investments have significantly lower value outside the relationships, 
they pose as a risk for firms. The risk is related to hold-up situations where the 
partner not making the investment is in a position of power and leverage. Partner 
firms can act opportunistically, attempt renegotiations to improve their terms and 
conditions, or threaten to leave the relationship (Sloof 2008; Ellingsen and 
Johannesson 2004).  
 
Firms apply formal contracts to govern transactions and relationships against 
risks related to hold-up situations  (Argyres and Mayer 2007; Poppo and Zenger 
2002). In practice, this implies specifying and formalizing required actions, 
consequences of contractual breach, and penalties for premature termination in a 
contract. (Poppo and Zenger 2002) By safeguarding their investments, firms can 
feel more secure dedicating- and customizing resources specific to relationships. 
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The more an investment is customized to a transaction or relationship, the 
greater the asset specificity and related risk (Anderson and Schimittlein 1984; 
Mooi and Ghosh 2010). Asset specificity thus increases the complexity of 
contracts (Poppo and Zenger 2002).  
  
 2.2.2. Environmental Uncertainty  
Noordewier, John and Nevin (1990, 82) define environmental uncertainty as 
“unanticipated changes in circumstances surrounding an exchange.” It relates to 
forces in the environment that firms have little or no control over. These forces, 
however, have a large impact on performance in relationships (Selnes and Sallis 
2003).  
 
The rational behind this concept is that when transaction environments are more 
uncertain, there are a greater number of contingencies that could disturb 
relationships (Williamson 1975; 1985). Firms are often unable to assign 
probability of something happening in the future and predict outcomes (Milliken 
1987). This challenges companies to adapt to problems seeming from unforeseen 
events (Poppo and Zenger 2002). Environmental uncertainty is a motivation for 
firms to apply formal contracts for their transaction, thus creating value by 
reducing uncertainty (Mooi and Ghosh 2010).  
 
 2.2.3. Measurement Ambiguity 
Exchange partners´ contribution to relationships can be hard to measure, and 
affects the observability of transactional exchange outcomes (Holmstron 1979). 
Difficulties measuring performance is viewed as an exchange hazard for firms 
(Mayer and Salomon 2006; Mooi and Ghosh 2010; Poppo and Zenger 2002). 
Mooi and Ghosh (2010, 108) define measurement ambiguity as “the difficulty of 
defining ex ante and verifying ex post the products procured in the contract.”  
 
When contractual performance is difficult to measure, parties to the contract 
have incentives to limit their efforts towards fulfilling the agreement (Mooi and 
Ghosh 2010; Poppo and Zenger 2002; Alchian and Demsetz 1972). This gives 
root to opportunistic behavior and performance ambiguity, and can affect the 
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companies´ overall performance (Poppo and Zenger 2002). Firms are left with 
the option of either accepting lower performance or dedicate resources to 
performance measurement and monitoring. Consequently, more complex 
contracts are often drafted to specify delivered service levels and facilitate 
monitoring (Poppo and Zenger 2002).  
 
2.3. Contracting Capabilities 
In this chapter I will discuss how contracting can be a capability of firms, the 
concept contracting capabilities, and some dimensions of contracting 
capabilities.  
 
 2.3.1. Contracting as a Capability of Firms 
Lu et al. (2010) argue that a firm can only develop and sustain its competitive 
advantage if they can create an idiosyncratic pool of resources. Barney (1991) 
defines resources as: firm assets, capabilities, processes, attributes, information, 
and knowledge.  
 
The relationship between resources and capabilities is widely discussed in the 
literature. Teece, Pisano and Shuen (1997) argue that “sustainable competitive 
advantage involves not only what assets a firm own but also how the firm 
integrates and transforms such assets through appropriate capabilities, since 
capabilities is difficult to acquire and imitate” (Teece, Pisano and Shuen 1997 in 
Lu et al. 2010, 421). Capabilities are viewed as “intermediate goods generated 
by the firm to enhance productivity of its resources” (Amit and Schoemaker 
1993, 35). 
 
One can view capabilities at different levels in the firm, and several types of 
capabilities can be distinguished (Eisenhardt and Martin 2000). Based on the 
definition provided by Amit and Schoemaker above (1993), management of 
formal contracts is a capability of companies when these firms exploit their 
resources to enhance contractual performance. Contracting capabilities are 
therefore suggested as a capability of firms. The concept of contracting 
capabilities will be further elaborated on in the next sections of this thesis. 
   GRA 19003 Master Thesis 
 
 
24 
2.3.2. The Concept of Contracting Capabilities 
In this thesis I build on an article by Argyres and Mayer (2007) about “Contract 
design as a firm capability: an integration of learning and transaction cost 
perspectives.” Argyres and Mayer (2007) are so far the biggest contributors on 
this topic with their managerial perspective on capabilities for designing detailed 
commercial contracts. They define contracting capabilities as a firm´s ability and 
capacity to perform certain tasks related to designing formal contracts and 
aligning contract terms with transaction attributes.  
 
Although I agree with the definition suggested by Argyres and Mayer (2007), I 
still find it insufficient to portray the full extent of this concept. It seems more 
like a description than a definition, and a bit vague. My argument is that 
contracting capabilities involves more than just the design of contracts. Argyres 
and Mayer (2007) support that contracting capabilities involves more than just 
design of contracts and have stated that their narrow view on contracting 
capabilities is a limitation of their research.  
 
The entire contracting process should be acknowledged, as contracting 
capabilities also concerns the preparation and follow-up of formal written 
contracts. Weber and Mayer (2005) support the importance of negotiation skills 
as a contract capability, and Rigault (2010) argue the significance of contract 
enforcement. I therefore elaborate on the definition by Argyres and Mayer 
(2007), and propose my own definition of contracting capabilities as:  
 
“…a firms ability and capacity to perform tasks and activities related 
to negotiating, writing, and enforcing formal written contracts, with 
the objective of governing their resources and transactions to enhance 
relationship performance.” 
 
Argyres and Mayer (2007) argue that successful management of formal written 
contracts can enhance performance and be a source of advantage for firms. They 
further suggest that adapting contracts to transaction attributes and allocating 
resources with the appropriate knowledge to the right contracting term is key in 
this process (Argyres and Mayer 2007). The basis of the article is a related paper 
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by Mayer and Argyres (2004), where they find that contracting is a learning 
process and a way to manage inter-firm relationships over time.  
 
Apart from the two papers mentioned above, the concept contracting capabilities 
remains relatively unexplored. To my knowledge, no empirical studies are 
conducted on contracting capabilities with an attempt to measure a firms 
contracting capabilities or research how they can be developed.  
 
Weber and Mayer (2005) provide a framework for building contracting 
capabilities. However, the framework is not based on empirical investigation. 
Several other studies also examine how firms learn to contract (Ryall and 
Sampson 2009; Mooi and Ghosh 2010; Masten 1999), but these studies do not 
look at contracting capabilities explicitly.  
 
 2.3.3. Dimensions of Contracting Capabilities 
To get a further understanding of contracting capabilities I have divided the 
construct into four dimensions. Thus to portray different aspects companies 
encounter and need to succeed with in contractual work. The division is based 
on my own structuring of different theoretical contributions in the contracting 
literature. The contracting capabilities dimensions are: term specification and 
writing, contract adaptation, internal organizing and relationship development 
and maintenance. They will now be elaborated on. 
 
2.3.3.1. Term Specification and Writing 
The first dimension relates to general knowledge on how to prepare, use, and 
follow-up formal agreements. This encompasses an understanding of how to 
plan, negotiate, write, and monitor formal contracts, which is a prerequisite to 
succeed with transactions governed by contracts (Weber and Mayer 2005). 
 
Specifying and writing terms and conditions is a central part of this dimension of 
contracting capabilities. This may include details on product specifications and 
quality, payment- and delivery details, and how changes in the above mentioned 
terms should be dealt with (Rigault 2010). Term specification and writing is the 
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most basic level of contractual work. It also represents the most frequently 
conducted activities when designing formal written contracts (Mayer and 
Argyres 2004). 
 
2.3.3.2. Contract Adaptation 
Another key dimension of firms’ contracting capabilities concerns contract 
adaptation. The rationale behind contract adaption is that every transaction and 
relationship is different and exposed to different threats. Firms should therefore 
seek to adapt their contracts accordingly. (Argyres and Mayer 2007; Mayer and 
Argyres 2004; Mooi and Ghosh 2010; Mayer and Salomon 2006) These authors 
also refer to antecedents of formal contracting (chapter 2.2) as the main 
argument why firms need to manage contract adaptation.  
 
Contract adaptation for specific exchanges is viewed as the area with the biggest 
potential to contribute to competitive advantage (Weber and Mayer 2005). Based 
on this I argue that adapting contractual terms to transaction specific factors 
should be included as a dimension of contracting capabilities.  
 
2.3.3.3. Internal Organizing 
This dimension is based on Argyres and Mayer´s (2007) dual alignment 
principle. They argue that contract terms should be aligned with a firms 
personnel and their knowledge. The rationale behind this argument is that 
different employees have different competencies. They are therefore equipped to 
handle different aspects of the contracting process. Weber and Mayer (2005) 
support this view, and argue that appropriate resource allocation within the firm 
helps facilitate the contracting process.  
 
Resource allocation relates to the internal organizing of the firm. In practice, this 
includes getting the right people involved, delegating roles and responsibilities, 
and deciding who should be in charge (Argyres and Mayer 2007; Weber and 
Mayer 2005). In this way the contracting process is based on a team effort that is 
set to extract the full potential of the staff.  
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A prerequisite to succeed with internal organizing lies in understanding where 
capabilities and competence lies in the organization (Argyres and Mayer 2007; 
Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995; Zollo and Winter 2002). As a result, firms can 
further develop their contracting capabilities for a competitive advantage 
(Argyres and Mayer 2007).  
 
2.3.3.4. Relationship Development and Maintenance 
To this point, contracting capabilities have been discussed in general with no 
distinction between domestic- and international contracts. The new occurring 
requirements when one of the trading partners is from a different nationality are 
so far not debated. Parkhe (1993 in Skarmeas, Katisikeas and Schlegemilch 
2002, 763) argues that “when trading activities cross national boarders, 
significant differences in cultural, national, organizational, and managerial 
factors between exchange parties pervade the relationship.” This suggests that 
firms are opposed to new requirements to succeed in a continuously more 
globalized world that is characterized by international trade and different 
cultures (Brown and Eisenhardt 1998).  
 
A study by Skarmeas, Katisikeas and Schlegelmilch (2002) shows that cultural 
sensitivity displayed by an exporter contributes to commitment in trade 
relationships. Familiarity with cultural differences is critical to relationship 
performance when trading abroad.  
 
What becomes clear is the mandate for interpersonal skills, etiquette, and cross-
cultural understanding. Possessing knowledge about your partners´ traditions, 
business practices, and codes of conduct when engaging in trade relations, may 
very well be a source of advantage.  
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2.4. Summary of Theory 
Several points drawn from the theoretical background have implications for this 
master thesis. First, even though formal contracts and trust can be substitutes, a 
formal written contract provides firms with security hard to accomplish by a 
trustful relationship. Even harder if the transaction is subject to hazards and 
between partnerships subject to cultural differences.  
 
Secondly, an exhaustive list of activities that should be included in the 
contracting capabilities construct is difficult to provide. What does become 
clear, however, is that contracting capabilities also involves preparing and 
follow-up of formal contracts.  
 
A third implication for this master thesis is the opportunities for contract 
adaptation. For each transaction partners are free to decide what they want to 
include in the contract depending on their needs, resources and preferences. That 
being said; with great power comes great responsibility. Contracting capabilities 
is thus a source of advantage for firms, which helps them rationalize and devote 
resources to contractual work in best manner possible. This highlights the 
importance of contracting capabilities, and why this thesis is an important 
contribution to this topic.  
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3. Research Hypotheses 
In this chapter I discuss some factors proposed to influence contracting 
capabilities and the performance implications of these capabilities, based on 
relationships suggested in my research model (figure 1.1). This provides the 
basis for my research hypotheses, which will now be presented. 
  
3.1. Factors Influencing Contracting Capabilities 
In my research model I have proposed seven characteristics of firms I believe 
might influence companies levels of contracting capabilities. Some of them are 
based on theoretical suggestions; resource slack, experience, internal consult and 
external consult. After examining the literature I did not find any evidence for 
the relationships between contracting capabilities and the firm characteristics age 
of firm, size of firm and training. These propositions are therefore based on my 
understanding of the concept contracting capabilities. The seven firm 
characteristics and related hypotheses are presented in the next sections. 
 
First, resource slack or resource inadequacy is defined as “a deficiency in the 
managerial, personnel or financial endowments that a manufacturer requires to 
engage in export-related activities” (Bello, Chelariu and Zhang 2003, 4). These 
activities also include forming contracts to govern transactions and relationships 
with foreign exchange partners.  
 
As contracting capabilities is related to capacity of performing activities related 
to contracting, I argue that resource slack has a negative impact on contracting 
capabilities. On the other hand, if firms have the resources to dedicate managers´ 
time and effort to export activities, they can coordinate tasks like contracting 
more efficiently (Root 1994). I therefore propose the following relationship:  
 
H1a: The more company resources available for export activities, the higher the 
level of contracting capabilities.  
 
Secondly, contracting is viewed as a learning process. Contracts are shown to 
become increasingly more detailed and effective as firms learn from previous 
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mistakes (Mayer and Argyres 2004; Ryall and Sampson 2009). I argue that over 
time, and as firms engage in more contractual relationships, their capabilities 
with negotiating, writing and enforcing contracts improves. This leads to the 
following hypothesis:  
 
H1b: The more experience in negotiating, writing and using contracts, the 
higher the level of contracting capabilities. 
  
H1c: The older the age of firm, the higher the level of contracting capabilities.  
 
The employee demographics often tend to be more diversified in larger firms, 
especially with regards to employee experience and educational background. 
They are also able to have more developed support functions, e.g. own legal 
department. The size of the firm may also be an indication of the number of 
transactions and complexity of those transactions. I therefore propose that: 
 
H1d: The larger the firm size, the higher the level of contracting capabilities. 
 
The practice of engaging consultation in matters where the firm does not hold 
the necessary competence is growing rapidly. Either in-house employment of 
lawyers or outsourcing services from more specialized law firms is an 
opportunity for firms to expand their knowledge base (Weber and Mayer 2005; 
PWC 2013). This leads me to hypothesize: 
 
H1e: The higher degree of internal consult applied in contracting activities, the 
higher the level of contracting capabilities. 
 
H1f: The higher degree of external consult applied in contracting activities, the 
higher the level of contracting capabilities. 
 
Firms that identify best practices and implement routines and guidelines for their 
employees may experience a more competent and skilled staff (Merchant and 
Van der Stede 2012). Thus, I propose: 
 
H1g: The higher the degree of employee training in contractual work, the higher 
the level of contracting capabilities.  
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3.2. Contracting Capabilities and Performance Implications 
Several authors have discussed the performance implications of capabilities. 
Morgan, Vohires and Mason (2009, 910) argue that firms need to require 
capabilities to “be able to deploy available resources in ways that match the 
market conditions faced in order to drive firm performance.” Teece (2007) and 
Helfat (1997) support this view. Firm-specific capabilities are critical to a firm´s 
success (Mayer and Salomon 2006), and a source of competitive advantage 
(Weber and Mayer 2005).  
 
This view is also supported for contracting capabilities, which are associated 
with more successful contractual relationships. Contracting capabilities are 
perceived to have positive performance implications (Argyres and Mayer 2007; 
Weber and Mayer 2005). When firms have the ability and capacity to perform 
tasks related to contracts in their exchange relationships they can prevent 
performance losses and costs arising from hazards, and extract more out of their 
relationships (Poppo and Zenger 2002,.  This can contribute to higher 
performance and leads to the following hypotheses:   
 
H2a: The higher the level of contracting capabilities, the higher is economic 
firm performance. 
 
H2b: The higher the level of contracting capabilities, the higher is relationship 
firm performance. 
 
In the analysis section in chapter 5 I test the hypotheses and present the findings.  
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4. Methodology 
This chapter covers the research method used in this thesis. First, a presentation 
will be given of the choice of research design, qualitative interviews, key 
informants, context, data collection method, sampling, measures, data collection 
process and sample characteristics. Thereafter, measures will be assessed. 
Finally, validity, reliability, and undimensionality are evaluated, and some 
descriptive statistics presented.  
	  
4.1. Research Design 
A research design is the plan and structure for investigation, perceived to obtain 
answers to research questions (Cooper and Schindler 2011). A good research 
design provides a framework to ensure that research is conducted efficiently 
(Sauders, Lewis and Thornhill 2012). It encompasses, amongst others, how data 
will be collected, measured and analyzed (Cooper and Schindler 2011). 
 
 4.1.1. The Nature of The Research Design 
Research designs can be descriptive, exploratory or explanatory. (Saunders, 
Lewis and Thornhill 2012) The objective of descriptive research is to gain an 
accurate profile of situations, events or persons. An exploratory study asks open 
questions to gain insights about a topic of interest, while explanatory research 
establishes causal relationships between variables (Sauders, Lewis and Thornhill 
2012).    
 
As the purpose of this thesis is to provide companies with a better understanding 
of how they can develop contracting capabilities to enhance their performance, 
both an exploratory and explanatory research design were used to answer my 
research question. An exploratory research design was used in interviews to get 
insight about firms contracting practices, while an explanatory research design 
was used for the analysis of relationships between variables. 
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4.1.2. Qualitative and Quantitative Data 
Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2012) differentiate between two main types of 
data, qualitative and quantitative. While qualitative research generates non-
numerical data, quantitative research is often referred to as a data collection 
technique that generates numerical data (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill 2012).  
 
In this master thesis I have applied both qualitative and quantitative data. The 
qualitative data was collected during interviews to get a further understanding of 
the contracting capabilities construct. Thus, the qualitative data have a 
supporting role.  
 
The quantitative data was collected with a questionnaire to analyze practices for 
firms in the same industry based on numerical data. The quantitative data has a 
dominant role in my data collection, as they provide the foundation for analyzing 
relationships in my research model. 
 
 4.1.3. Research Approach 
Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2012) differentiate between deductive and 
inductive approaches to research. A deductive approach entails that theory is 
developed and then tested through propositions. (Sauders, Lewis and Thornhill 
2012) With an inductive approach data is collected prior to the development of 
theory and the results often result in the proposition of a framework.  
 
I am open to discover new patterns and relationships in my qualitative data to 
provide new theories, indicating an inductive approach. However, I have 
provided theoretical propositions I seek to test through the collection of data, 
thus my approach is mainly deductive.  
 
4.2. Qualitative Interviews with Pilot Study 
As an extension to prior research on formal contracts, this thesis investigates 
how firms use contracts in their business and firms contracting capabilities. 
Since the theoretical foundation on contracting capabilities is limited, I have 
conducted qualitative interviews as a supplement to current literature on the 
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topic of contracting capabilities. In this chapter, the purpose of the interviews is 
presented. Subsequently, the choice of informants and findings from the 
interviews are discussed. 
 
 4.2.1. Purpose of The Interviews 
To improve the quality of the empirical study, three interviews with three 
different informants were conducted. The interviews had three main purposes. 
The first purpose was to gain a further understanding of the informants’ 
experience and practical knowledge of negotiation, writing and enforcing formal 
contracts for their transactions.  
 
The second purpose was to find out whether the informants could supplement 
theory and previous research on contract capabilities. The informants were asked 
to pinpoint the skills necessary to succeed with negotiation, writing and using 
formal contracts. The construct contracting capabilities is not an established 
topic in the industry. This topic was thus discussed thoroughly during the 
interviews in order to ensure a common understanding of the topic. 
 
In addition, the interviews were used as an arena to pilot test the survey in order 
to check its understandability and make necessary changes.  
 
4.2.2. Qualitative Informants 
I chose to approach three very different firms in terms of size, extent of export 
activities, and contracting practices to gain different perspectives. The 
demographics of the firms are summarized in table 1.1.  
Table 1.1: Demographics of qualitative informants 
 
 Number of 
employees 
Export activities 
% of production 
Exports to… Extent of contract use for 
export transactions 
Company 1 30  10% All over the world <5% 
Company 2 20 90 % USA, Europe 100% 
Company 3 4000 in Norway 90-100% All over the world 100 % 
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The first two interviews were personal meetings, while the last were conducted 
by phone for practical reasons. Due to confidentiality issues, all traceable 
characteristics of interviewed firms are excluded in the thesis. 
 
 4.2.3. The Interviews 
In this section the main findings from the qualitative interviews are presented. 
The findings are shown for each company individually.   
 
Company 1 
The first interview was with a small firm who only exports a small percentage of 
their goods. They produce for sale to countries all over the world. This firm has 
limited experience with formal contracting. Main focus was to discover why 
they did not emphasize use of formal contracts, and whether they experienced 
any problems in their transactions. The three main reasons why they relied on 
trust instead of formal agreements were (1) transactions of low value; (2) high 
costs of contracting; and (3) low risk of potential damage.  This firm also 
compensated for the absence of formal contracts with upfront payment from 
their exchange partners. Thus they were able to eliminate risk at low cost.  
 
Company 2 
The second firm was approximately the same size as the first firm. They export 
almost all of their goods, mostly to the U.S. and Europe. This firm applies 
formal contracts in all their transactions. In this interview I focused on why they 
apply formal contracts, and what specifications they include in formal contracts. 
Attention was also given to problems that could occur in their exchange 
relationships. Finally, the contracting capabilities construct was discussed. 
 
The informant proved very helpful in shedding light on the rationale firms have 
for entering formal contracts. He/she argued that the absence of formal contracts 
for transactions with customers abroad shows signs of inexperience and 
recklessness. In his/her line of business they often engage in exchange 
relationships with companies they have never had personal meetings with. The 
exchange relationships are therefore characterized by the absent of trust, since 
trust often builds over time. Thus, the need for formal contracts is emphasized. 
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Further, some transaction attributes were argued to impact this firms level of 
detail in contracts. They were: value of transaction, complexity of products, and 
risk.  
 
The informant from the second interview also indicated that their internal 
organizing were something he/she considered as an important aspect of 
contracting capabilities. Adapting contracts to product features, activities, value 
chain, and financial status is something this firm was very concerned with.  
 
Company 3 
The third interview was with a large multinational corporation with operations 
all across the globe. The company have thousands of employees worldwide, 
lawyers- and a legal department in each country they operate in. This firm 
exports almost all of their goods, and use formal contracts for every transaction 
when they export. 
  
In this interview I focused on the contracting capabilities construct. The 
informant was asked open questions about contracting capabilities, and what 
abilities and capacities companies need to succeed with formal contracts in 
exchange relationships. 
 
The third informant is a lawyer specialized in contracting. He/she has long 
experience with international exchange partners and detailed commercial 
contracts. The insights provided by this informant were indispensable for the 
development of items to measure contracting capabilities.  
 
The main findings from the third interview can be summarized as follows: 
Firstly, specifications of terms and conditions in formal contracts prevent 
misunderstandings in exchange relationships. Consequences of contractual 
breach are also important to formalize in the contract. If companies manage to 
negotiate strict terms regarding consequences of contractual breach they can 
prevent such breaches to occur, because their partners would suffer significant 
financial penalties in case of breach.  
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Secondly, contracts should be adapted to environmental and transaction specific 
factors. The informant emphasized risk and potential extent of damage for their 
products as drivers for written terms in the contract. Thus, terms are drafted in 
contracts to transfer risk and responsibility. 
 
Thirdly, the informant argued that contracts should be adapted to companies´ 
products and value chains as part of the internal organizing in contractual work.  
Companies need to know their own organization to succeed. 
 
The informant also emphasized the mandate for interpersonal skills. The ability 
to communicate, read and understand people is helpful in contractual work. 
Understanding cultural differences and business practices is important, but you 
also have to make sure that they know yours. Engaging in contractual 
relationships thus requires the ability to develop and maintain relationships.  
 
Overall, the qualitative interviews made significant contributions to the survey, 
and several of the questions in the survey were discovered during these 
conversations.  
 
4.3. Key Informants 
The focus of my thesis was to measure respondents´ perceptions on contractual 
work from the supplier side of the supplier-buyer dyad. Based on previous 
studies on supplier-buyer relationships, I relied on one key informant from each 
company with responsibility for contracts in one or more exchange relationships 
(Sande and Haugland 2011; Poppo and Zenger 2002).  
 
To make sure the respondents had the rights profile, I approached every firm by 
phone. This was done to locate the respondent holding the proper knowledge and 
responsibility of contracts regarding sales to customers abroad. Consequently, 
the questionnaires were sent to respondents by e-mail. Confidence that the right 
person responded to the survey is high, since I first called the respondent, and 
then sent personal e-mails with link to the survey. 
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4.4. Machinery, Equipment and Vehicles Industry 
Industry lists from the online database Proff Forvalt was obtained for the data 
collection. I extracted companies from the database with production of 
machinery and equipment for general use (defined as industry 28), production of 
motor vehicles and trailers (defined as industry 29), and production of other 
transport vehicles (defined as industry 30). All industries are defined according 
to NACE industry definitions. These industries were chosen because they 
represent a major part of the Norwegian economy, where development of 
capabilities to enhance performance would be a valuable contribution. 
 
In addition to the above mentioned industries, three criteria for choice of 
companies were applied. These criteria were that the company should be 
Norwegian or located in Norway, engage in activities related to production of 
goods sold to customers abroad and have more than 10 employees.  
 
4.5. Data Collection Method 
A questionnaire is a data collection method where each person is asked to 
respond to the same questions in a predetermined order (Sauders, Lewis and 
Thornhill 2012). This data collection method help facilitate standardization and 
comparison of numerical data, and provide opportunities to evaluate 
relationships and form models based on the results (Sauders, Lewis and 
Thornhill 2012).  
 
In a cross-sectional questionnaire data is collected at a single point in time over 
several units to represent a larger population. (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and 
Jackson 2008) A cross-sectional questionnaire makes is possible to investigate 
how different variables vary across these units. The questionnaire applied in this 
thesis is cross-sectional and companies function as units of analysis. The survey 
and associated cover letter can be viewed in Appendix 2.  
 
 4.5.1. Online Questionnaire 
The data collection was conducted using an online questionnaire through the 
survey platform Qualtrics. This provided several advantages. It made it possible 
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to gather data at low cost, and to reach the necessary number of participants 
without external help from professionals. Qualtrics distributes the survey based 
on a premade recipient list and data input is automatic, which is time efficient. 
Once the survey was sent, the respondents could choose when to answer. This 
made it unnecessary for me to be present when they submitted their answers.  
Also, the survey platform requested responses to questions the respondents had 
left out, which prevented missing values in the dataset.  
  
Online questionnaires also have some disadvantages. First, environmental 
factors are difficult to control. Further, as respondents were given flexibility in 
when they completed the survey, it could easily be forgotten. Time constraints 
should also be listed as a threat or barrier to answers if the questionnaire was 
perceived too long or extensive to complete.  
 
In general, it can be difficult to ensure a sufficiently high response rate. To 
ensure a high response rate, I called all firms personally before sending the 
survey. This was done to make sure the right person in the company received the 
survey and that he or she felt obligated to answer. The respondents were also 
guaranteed confidentiality to eliminate this as a reason not to respond.  
Another factor to consider is the large number of inquiries firms receive from 
students. To ensure a satisfactory response rate I researched previous surveys to 
see which industries had the highest response rates to surveys. I also familiarized 
myself with ongoing thesis projects amongst my colleagues at BI Norwegian 
Business School to avoid calling the same firms. I sent out two reminder e-mails 
to increase the response rate (Appendix 3).  
 
4.6. Sampling 
Two types of samplings can be identified, namely probability and non-
probability sampling (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill 2012). For probability 
sampling the chance of being selected from the population is known and 
research questions can be answered by statistically estimating the characteristics 
of the population from the sample. For non-probability sampling this chance of 
being selected is unknown and research questions that require statistical 
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inferences about characteristics of populations cannot be answered (Sauders, 
Lewis and Thornhill 2012).  
 
As I am interested in making statistically valid conclusions, I had to ensure that 
the sampling was representative and that each respondent had the same chance to 
participate (Sauders, Lewis and Thornhill 2012).  
 
I decided to select my sample amongst Norwegian companies due to practical 
reasons. They would be easier to get hold of and communicate with, since we 
share the same mother language. Further, I chose to approach firms with 
production of machinery and equipment for general use, motor vehicles and 
trailers, and other transport vehicles as my sample frame, described in chapter 
4.4.  
 
The list of firms was extracted from the online database Proff Forvalt. Such 
databases are often incomplete, inaccurate or out of date (Sauders, Lewis and 
Thornhill 2012). Thus, I ensured that the database was based on public registers 
of companies and chose the last published version.  
 
The database did not enable to sort out only export firms. I thus assured that the 
firms were engaged in export when I approached them by phone. Only firms 
exporting their goods to one or several countries were included in the sample.  
 
Further, two types of firms were left out of the survey: First, firms that export, 
but do not use contracts are excluded because they would be unable to answer 
the majority of the questions in the survey. Secondly, firms that use contracts 
when they export, but handle their contracts locally in other countries are 
excluded because their answers would not reflect Norwegian practices. 
 
In some cases the industry lists contained contact information for several 
business units in each firm. I chose to approach one division in each firm, 
mainly headquarters. The rationale behind this was that several survey responses 
from each firm could affect the statistical validity of my results. It is reason to 
believe that the different divisions in a firm apply the same practices and 
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therefore will have similar responses. The results would therefore be affected by 
big corporations with many divisions and not reflect the sample as whole. When 
several daughter companies owned by one corporation where listed, I 
approached all companies functioning as a separate legal entity.  
 
All participants viewed available and eligible to participate in the survey based 
on the criteria presented in this section, where given the same opportunity to do 
so. 
 
4.7. Measures 
Most of the variables in my research model are previously used in empirical 
research, and have valid measures. Where the measures existed, they were used. 
In the cases where measures did not exist, new ones were developed. They are 
based on related research, input from my supervisor and key informants so no 
pretest was concluded.  
 
 4.7.1. Dependent Variables 
A dependent variable will change in response to changes in other variables 
(Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill 2012, 424). In this research model, firm 
performance is a dependent variable.  
 
4.7.1.1. Firm Performance 
Firm performance can be established in several ways, and both objective and 
perceptual measures are widely used (Morgan, Vohires and Mason 2009). 
Perceptual measures indicate a firm´s subjective evaluation of their performance 
compared to their industry (Lusch and Brown 1996; Lu et al. 2010). They can be 
appropriate when firms are unwilling, or unable, to provide financial measures. 
They are also appropriate when there are variations in accounting practices (Lu 
et al. 2010; Woodcock, Beamish and Makino 1994).  
 
Previous studies show that perceptual measures of performance correlate well 
with objective measures of performance (Dess and Robinson 1984; Geringer and 
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Hebert 1991). In this thesis I apply perceptual measures. All firms approached to 
participate in the study are from the same industries. This choice was made to 
avoid variation in firm performance due to industry structure, as well as other 
environmental factors (Lusch and Brown 1996).  
 
In this thesis I applied economic export performance to measure economic firm 
performance, and customer export performance to measure relationship firm 
performance. The latter is a measure of partnership satisfaction at the level of 
buyer satisfaction (Poppo and Zenger 2002; Anderson and Narus 1990; Mohr 
and Speckman 1994; Saxton 1997). The frame is based on how they have 
performed compared to their closest competitors the last 12 moths on a 7 point 
Likert scale (1=much worse, 4=the same, 7=much better), see table 4.1. and 4.2.  
 
The question asked in the survey to measure economic export performance is: 
“How has your firm performed economically compared to your closest 
competitors the last 12 months?”  
 
Table 4.1: Questionnaire items for measuring economic export performance 
 
Item Item Statement Item previously used by 
eper1 Export sales volume Morgan et al. 2004 
eper2 Export market share Morgan et al. 2004, Lu et al. 2010  
eper3 Profitability Morgan et al. 2004, Lusch and 
Brown 1996 
eper4 Percentage of sales revenue derived from products introduced in 
foreign markets during the last three years 
Morgan et al. 2004 
 
The question asked in the survey to measure customer export performance is: 
“How has your firm performed in customer relationships compared to your 
closest competitors the last 12 months?”  
Table 4.2: Questionnaire items for measuring customer export performance 
 
Item Item Statement Item previously used by 
cper1 Quality of your company´s relationships with foreign customers Morgan et al. 2004 
cper2 Reputation of your company amongst your foreign customers Morgan et al. 2004  
cper3 Foreign customer loyalty to your firm Morgan et al. 2004 
cper4 Foreign customers satisfaction Morgan et al. 2004, Lu et al. 2010 
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 4.7.2. Independent Variables 
An independent variable is a variable that causes changes in the dependent 
variable (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill 2012, 424). In this case contracting 
capabilities is an independent variable with consequences for the dependent 
variable firm performance. To measure contracting capabilities a new scale were 
developed.  
 
4.7.2.1. Contracting Capabilities 
The construct contracting capabilities is fairly new and no measures are 
currently available. One of the objectives of this thesis is to identify what this 
construct encompasses, and to develop some items on how it can be measured. 
Some theoretical contributions provided in chapter 2.3 were used as masis for 
some of the items (Argyres and Mayer 2007; Mayer and Argyres 2004; Mayer 
and Salomon 2006; Weber and Mayer 2005). Input from my thesis supervisor 
Jon Bingen Sande and interview informants also proved helpful.  
 
The list of items is not exhaustive, but should include the most significant 
aspects of the contracting process. Responses are framed in line with 
conceptualization of capabilities as organizational processes performed relative 
to competitors (Morgan, Vohires and Mason 2009; Bingham, Eisenhardt and 
Furr 2007; Ethiraj et al. 2005).  
 
The question asked is “compared to what you believe is normal amongst your 
closest competitors, how good is your firms capacity/competence to perform the 
following activities?” Answers are rated on a 7 point Likert scale (1=very poor 
capacity/competence, 4=approximately the same capacity/competence, 7=very 
good capacity/competence), see table 4.3 to 4.6. 
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Table 4.3: Questionnaire items for measuring contracting capabilities as term 
specification and writing 
 
Item Item Statement Item previously used by 
cc3 Plan formal, written contracts New 
cc13 Negotiate terms and conditions in contracts New 
cc14 Specify/formulate technological specifications, product specifications 
and product quality in formal contracts 
New 
cc15 Specify/formulate payment conditions in formal contracts New 
cc16 Specify/formulate terms of delivery in formal contracts New 
cc17 Specify, formulate and follow up on how changes in prices, product 
specifications and terms of delivery should be managed 
New 
cc18 Monitoring of export customers contractual follow-up New 
cc19 Mediation skills for disagreements and conflicts New 
 
Table 4.4: Questionnaire items for measuring contracting capabilities as 
contract adaptation 
 
Item Item Statement Item previously used by 
cc6 Analyze/understand how contracts should be adapted to special 
characteristics of transactions with customers abroad 
New 
cc7 Analyze/understand how contracts should be adapted to special 
characteristics of the customers value chain/needs 
New 
cc8 Analyze/understand how contracts should be adapted to the type of 
relationship we want with our customers 
New 
cc9 Analyze/understand how contracts should be adapted to different 
market conditions 
New 
cc10 Analyze/understand how contracts should be adapted to different 
countries legal systems 
New 
cc11 Analyze/understand how contracts should be adapted to different types 
of risks related to projects 
New 
cc12 Analyze/understand how contracts should be adapted to different 
projects responsibilities and scope of damage 
New 
 
 
Table 4.5: Questionnaire items for measuring contracting capabilities as internal 
organizing 
 
Item Item Statement Item previously used by 
cc1 Delegate responsibilities and tasks related to contractual work within 
my firm 
New  
cc2 Conduct financial analyzes to evaluate the profitability of transactions 
and customer relationships. 
New 
cc4 Analyze/understand how contracts should be adapted to special 
characteristics of my firm´s products  
New 
cc5 Analyze/understand how contracts should be adapted to special 
characteristics of my firm´s value chain and activities 
New 
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Table 4.6: Questionnaire items for measuring contracting capabilities as 
relationship development and maintenance 
 
Item Item Statement Item previously used by 
cc20 Ability to cooperate with customers to reach common goals New 
cc21 Develop and sustain interpersonal relationships New 
cc22 Adjust to cultural differences between my firm and customers firms´ 
abroad 
New 
cc23 Adjust to different customs and practices in different countries New 
 
 
 4.7.3. Control Variables 
In the model I also included some control variables I propose to have a positive 
impact on level of contracting capabilities within firms; resource slack, 
experience, age of firm, size of firm, internal consult, external consult and 
training.  
 
4.7.3.1. Resource Slack 
To measure the firm’s available resources for conducting export activities, four 
items previously used by Bello, Chalariu and Zhang (2003) are applied. The 
respondents are asked to “consider the following statements and evaluate your 
firms resources…” The questions are framed on a 7 point Likert scale from 
1=completely disagree, 4=neither agree nor disagree to 7=completely agree, see 
table 4.7. 
Table 4.7: Questionnaire items for measuring resource slack 
 
Item Item Statement Item previously used by 
res1 Our firm lacks the financial resources needed to expand our export 
efforts 
Bello et al. 2003 
res2 Most of our resources are devoted to the domestic market, leaving little 
room for export expansion 
Bello et al. 2003 
res3 Human resources limit my firm´s ability to increase our export activities Bello et al. 2003 
res4 Our export expansion is limited by the time and effort that management 
can devote to exporting 
Bello et al. 2003 
 
4.7.3.2. Experience 
New items were developed to measure experience with contractual work in 
cooperation with my thesis supervisor. The respondents are asked to evaluate 
“What are your firms experience in negotiating, writing and using formal, 
written contracts?” and range their answers on a 7 point scale from 
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1=completely disagree, 4=neither agree nor disagree to 7=completely agree, see 
table 4.8. 
Table 4.8: Questionnaire items for measuring experience 
 
Item Item Statement Item previously used by 
exp1 We have long experience with the use of formal, written contracts New 
exp2 We have expertise in writing formal contracts New 
exp3 We have many employees with experience in negotiating formal, written 
contracts 
New 
 
4.7.3.3. Age of Firm 
Age of firm is measured in one question, as basic as “What is the age of your 
firm?” with a request to answer in number of years (Beuve and Saussier 2011).  
 
4.7.3.4. Size of Firm 
Size of firm is established based on “How many people are employed by your 
firm?” (Beuve and Saussier 2011; Rokkan, Heide and Wathne 2003; Morgan, 
Kaleke and Katsikeas 2004; Morgan, Vohires and Mason 2009). The 
respondents are requested to answer in approximately number of employees.  
 
 
4.7.3.5. Internal Consult 
One item is used to measure internal consult: “How many lawyers are employed 
by your firm?” in approximately number of lawyers.  
 
4.7.3.6. External Consult 
External consult is measured on “To what extent does your firm apply external 
consultation for contractual work related to export transactions?” on a 7 point 
Likert scale from 1= to a very small extent to 7=to a very large extent, see table 
4.9. 
Table 4.9: Questionnaire items for measuring external consult 
 
Item Item Statement Item previously used by 
ec1 We use external lawyers for contractual work related to export 
transactions 
New 
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4.7.3.7. Training 
Five new items are developed in cooperating with my supervisor for the use of 
guidelines, routines and training for employees regarding contractual work. They 
are asked to evaluate the items based on “to what extent does your firm 
have/apply…” with a frame from 1= to a very small extent to 7=to a very large 
extent, see table 4.10. 
Table 4.10: Questionnaire items for measuring training 
 
Item Item Statement Item previously used by 
train1 Routines and guidelines for contractual work New 
train2 Training of new employees in contractual work New 
train3 Employees participate in courses and seminars in contractual work for 
academic knowledge 
New 
train4 Employees read academic papers, press and reports to stay up to date on 
contractual work 
New 
train5 Processes for identification of “best practices” on how to work with 
formal contracts 
New 
 
 
4.8. Data Collection Process 
The study was a self-administered questionnaire. A cover letter containing a 
template was therefore included as part of the questionnaire to explain the 
purpose of the study. This is in line with recommendations given by Saunders, 
Lewis and Thornhill (2012). The letter also informed that participation was 
voluntary, and that all information would be treated confidentially (see 
Appendix 2). An additional confidentiality agreement was provided to the 
respondents that required this.  
 
The master thesis was reported as a project to the Norwegian Social Science 
Data Services as obligated by Norwegian laws regarding storage of sensitive 
information (see Appendix 3).   
 
Prior to sending the questionnaire, I approached all firms by phone during the 
period 17.4.2013 to 10.5.2013. I contacted each firm to ensure that they fitted 
the criteria discussed in chapter 4.6. I also wanted to find respondents with 
proper knowledge within the area of interest. My progress in this period was 
inserted into an excel spreadsheet to keep tabs on their status with regards to 
who had been contacted, who did not fit the profile, who agreed to participate, 
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and who needed to be contacted at a later stage. This was done to structure the 
process and ensure quality in the data collection. 
 
Shortly after calling the respondents, e-mails were sent with a link to the survey. 
This was done to reduce the time elapsed from commitment to opportunity to 
participate, thus to ensure a higher response rate while they still felt obligated to 
respond. Two reminder e-mails were also sent to ensure more responses 
(Appendix 4).  
 
When I applied the search criteria as described in chapter 4.4 a total number of 
579 companies were extracted from the database. This includes several 
subdivisions of firms. 432 companies were removed because they did not fit the 
profile to participate in the study as discussed in chapter 4.6. 
 
Thus, out of the 579 companies contacted, 147 were viewed reachable and 
eligible to participate. A total of 117 companies agreed to contribute to the study 
and allowed my to send the survey. I received 76 responses (N=76), which gives 
an active response rate of 51,7 % (76/147).  
 
After revising the data, I found no responses that could interfere with the quality 
of my analyses. Thus no responses were removed. A comparable study by Mooi 
and Ghosh (2010) argue that their response rate of 59 % is favorable in light of 
other B2B studies. I therefore conclude that my response rate of 51,7 % is a 
good response rate.  
 
The results from the questionnaires were coded into numbers to run statistical 
analyses. A benefit of this procedure is that it gives an opportunity to enter data 
with fewer errors (Sauders, Lewis and Thornhill 2012). Answers were requested 
for most of the questions to prevent missing values. Some firms still chose not to 
answer some of the questions in the survey. A few values are therefore missing. 
The survey tool Qualtrics presented that 97 % of all questions were replied, 
which indicates that the majority of questions are answered. 
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4.9. Sample Characteristics 
Out of the 76 firms in the sample, formal contracts are used in 10 to 100 percent 
of all transactions when selling to customers abroad. Only firms with formal 
contracts were invited to participate in the survey. This entails that these firms 
will report a practice of applying formal contracts for their transactions above 
zero. As expected, the application of formal contracts is high (see table 4.11). 
 
Table 4.11: Use of formal contracts for export transaction 
 
 Minimum Maximum Mean 
Use of formal contracts 10 100 84.46 
The companies that responded to the questionnaire are between 7 and 151 years. 
They have between 8 and 22000 employees. This entails that the distribution of 
firms with regards to experience and size is broad. The companies also have 
between 0 and 30 employed lawyers. Most of the firms have 0 or 1 employed 
lawyer, which is supported by the low mean at 0,69. The majority of the firms 
do not have a legal department.  
 
With regard to external consultation, the respondents were asked to range their 
use on a 1-7 scale, where 1 is to a very small extent and 7 is to a very large 
extent. As shown in table 4.12, the mean at 3,05 shows a standard use of external 
help for contractual work.  
 
Table 4.12: Characteristics of companies 
 
 Minimum Maximum Mean 
Age of firm 7 151 44.57 
Number of employees 8 22000 697.54 
Internal Consult 0 30 .69 
Legal Department 1 2 1.83 
External Consult 1 7 3.05 
 
The sample characteristic of firms´ net operating income from export activities 
was hard to establish based on the responses. There were several missing values. 
Some respondents seem to have misunderstood that the question should be 
answered in millions, and some answers are listed with a range, e.g. 2-5 mill. I 
revised the responses to fit the same criteria of commas and numbers of zeros. 
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Based on this, the net operating incomes range between 0-480 million NOK. 
This again supports that I have a wide distribution of firms.  
 
The same problem occurred for the typical value of an export transaction for the 
firms. I was aware that this might cause problems prior to sending the survey, 
because firms are often reluctant to provide such information. Also, firms often 
operate with different measures. Still, the item was kept. All questions were 
based on their export activities in general, and not one specific transaction with 
one specific customer. The typical value of a transaction ranges from 50 000-850 
mill NOK.  
 
Furthermore, I wanted to examine the firms’ experience and extent of export 
activities. Therefore, their tenure as exporter and the percentage of their products 
sold abroad was established (see table 4.13). The responding firms report that 
they have been exporting from 2 to 151 years, with a mean of 27 years. The 
average of products to be exported is about 52 %.  
Table 4.13: Characteristics of firms export experience 
 
 Minimum Maximum Mean 
Tenure as exporter 2 151 27.53 
Percentage of products exported 2 100 52.51 
 
The average use of previously written contracts and premade templates, as 
foundation for new contracts, is listed at 65,45 percent. The adjustments made to 
these templates are moderate based on a 1-5 scale (see table 4.14). 
Table 4.14: Use of premade templates for formal contracts 
 
 Minimum Maximum Mean 
Use of templates in % 0 100 65.45 
Adjustment to template 1 5 2.91 
 
 
4.10. Measurement Evaluation 
In this chapter I will present an assessment of the constructs in my research 
model (figure 1.1).  I will evaluate model fit, validity, reliability and 
undimensionality for the constructs. 
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I used confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to ensure that the items applied in the 
questionnaire had valid measures, and to test the measurement models. Analyses 
were conducted in Lisrel 8.80 student edition, which enabled me to only 
measure 15 items simultaneously. 
 
When deciding on model fit for the measurement models, I applied the following 
criteria: p-value should be higher than 0,05, chi-square and degrees of freedom 
(df) similar to each other. Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) 
should be lower than 0,08 to fit the data reasonably, and lower than 0,05 to 
indicate close fit (Browne and Cudeck 1993 in Jörenskog and Sörbom 1993, 
124; Kelloway 1998).  
 
As a general rule, all factor loadings should be no less than 0,5 for the variables 
to have sufficient explanation, and all loadings higher than 0,5 are considered 
“practically significant" (Hair Jr. et al. 2010). Further, Hair Jr. et al. (2010) also 
provide guidelines for satisfactory factor loadings based on sample size. I have 
76 observations (N=76), and should therefore have factor loadings over 0,65. 
However, in practice I follow the general rule of 0,5 for models with god fit.  
 
Although the survey automatically requested responses for most questions, the 
dataset contained some missing values. To correct for this, I applied an Insert 
Missing Value function in Lisrel before I analyzed the data. Lisrel estimated the 
missing values based on average score of the other responses, and how other 
respondents with similar characteristics have responded. This was applied when 
the program was able to compute values to be inserted. For the other missing 
values I applied averages calculated in Excel.   
 
 4.10.1. Principal Component Analysis 
The student edition of Lisrel only allows for 15 variables to be evaluated at the 
same time. I therefore incurred some challenges for the contracting capabilities 
construct (CC), which contains 23 items in the questionnaire. As a solution to 
this problem, I ran a Principal Component Analysis in SPSS to see if the items 
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load on different components, thus to divide contracting capabilities into 
dimensions. 
 
First, a Kaiser-Mayer-Oklin measure was used to see if my distribution of values 
was adequate to conduct a Principal Component Analysis (George and Mallery 
2011; Stern 2011), see table 4.15. 
Table 4.15: KMO and Bartlett´s test 
 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy ,889 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity         
Approx. Chi-Square 
 
1702,104 
Degrees of Freedom 253 
Significance ,000 
 
 
A test statistics of 0,889 (see table 4.15) is valued at the top end of the scale as 
meritorious (George and Mallery 2011). This indicates that my data is adequate 
for analysis. Further, Bartlett´s test of sphericity indicates whether the 
correlation mix is an identity matrix. Data is viewed acceptable for analysis if 
the correlation mix is not an identity matrix. A significance of under 0,05 
indicates that the correlation mix is not an identity matrix. The data is thus 
appropriate for further testing (George and Mallery 2011). This was confirmed 
with a significance of 0 in my case. 
 
Secondly, the Rotated Component Matrix (table 4.16) shows the results of the 
Principal Component Analysis. I can see that the 23 items for the construct 
contracting capabilities load for four components. By reviewing the 
questionnaire (appendix 2) I see that the Principal Component Analysis support 
my suggested dimensions of contracting capabilities in chapter 2.3.3. This is 
found because the items put together by SPSS can all be attributed to the 
proposed dimensions. 
 
Factor 1 shows high loadings for item cc3 and cc13-cc19, ranging from 0,530 
and upward. All these items are related to the process of contracting and 
specifications; included planning, negotiating, monitoring and specifications. 
This seems logic based on theory presented on term specification and writing as 
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a dimension of contracting capabilities (chapter 2.3.3.1). The name term 
specification and writing (SKCC) is kept. 
 
Factor 2 has high loadings for cc6-cc12 ranging from 0,612 to 0,914. All the 
questions are related to how contracts should be adapted to different transaction 
and relationship attributes. This is in line with theory presented on contract 
adaptation (chapter 2.3.3.2). The dimension name is kept as contract adaptation 
(ADCC). 
  
Factor 3 shows high loadings for items cc1, cc2, cc4 and cc5, from 0,582 and 
upward. The items cover characteristics of the firm and internal organizing 
related to the contracting process. The dimension is termed internal organizing 
(FICC) since it involves the same activities as proposed in chapter 2.3.3.3.  
Factor 4 has high loadings for items cc20-cc23, ranging from 0,685 and upward. 
All items are related to interpersonal skills, cooperating and understanding of 
cultural differences. It therefore seems logical that they are placed together. The 
dimension is termed relationship development and maintenance (RECC) in line 
with theory discussed in chapter 2.3.3.4.  
 
The four identified dimensions of contracting capabilities will be applied for 
single-factor confirmatory analyses in Lisrel. This is presented in the next 
chapter. 
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Table 4.16: Rotated component matrixa 
 
    Components 
 (1) Term 
specification and 
writing 
(2) Contract 
adaptation 
(3) Internal 
organizing 
(4) Relationship 
development and 
maintenance 
cc3 ,530 ,313 ,519 ,160 
cc13 ,612 ,407 ,248 ,317 
cc14 ,707 ,215 ,111 ,271 
cc15 ,845 ,153 ,166 ,320 
cc16 ,867 ,201 ,204 ,224 
cc17 ,783 ,225 ,192 ,223 
cc18 ,673 ,333 ,010 ,306 
cc19 ,593 ,457 ,117 ,121 
cc6 ,483 ,612 ,434 ,103 
cc7 ,324 ,765 ,204 ,050 
cc8 ,258 ,725 ,213 ,257 
cc9 ,306 ,743 ,406 ,041 
cc10 ,090 ,914 ,105 ,042 
cc11 ,248 ,665 ,413 ,323 
cc12 ,307 ,763 ,142 ,307 
cc1 ,131 ,376 ,597 ,275 
cc2 ,054 ,160 ,765 ,138 
cc4 ,372 ,517 ,582 ,190 
cc5 ,423 ,569 ,584 -,060 
cc20 ,403 ,262 -,047 ,685 
cc21 ,365 ,108 ,003 ,801 
cc22 ,234 ,042 ,314 ,836 
cc23 ,193 ,154 ,308 ,864 
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 7 iterations. 
 
 
 4.10.2. Single-Factor Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
Theoretical constructs can be hard to operationalize in a single measure, 
especially for new constructs not previously examined. Measurement errors are 
therefore often unavoidable (Fornell and Larcker 1981). To assess how 
correlations among observed variables can be described by latent variables, and 
to investigate the measurement of constructs, I ran single-factor confirmatory 
factor analyses (see Appendix 5). Measurement models for age of firm, size of 
firm, internal consult, and external consult could not be tested because these 
constructs is only measured with one item each. 
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When I ran the resource slack construct (RES) I found that not all factor 
loadings were satisfactory with res1 “my firm lacks financial resources 
necessary to expand export efforts” at 0,36. Further, the model did not provide a 
good fit with RMSEA = 0,124. I saw from the questionnaire that res1 refers to 
financial resources, while the other items were related to human resources 
necessary to expand export efforts. This item was viewed non consistent with the 
others as measuring resource slack, and therefore removed. The model fit 
improved significantly, with all factor loadings over 0,55 (res2), chi-square and 
df = 0, p-value = 1, RMSEA = 0. Because of a low number of items, the fit 
indicators will show p-value = 0 and RMSEA = 0, with perfect model fit. 
 
For the experience construct (EXP), all factor loadings were over 0,51, and the 
model fit indicators as for resource slack with chi-square and df = 0, p-value = 1, 
and RMSEA = 0. The model was kept without alterations.  
 
When I ran the training construct (TRAIN), all factor loadings were over 0,69 
and satisfactory. However, the model had a poor fit. I opened for a correlation 
between items train1 “routines and guidelines for contractual work” and train2 
“training of new employees in contractual work”, as suggested as a modification 
indices by Lisrel. The rational is based on firms practice to implement routines 
and guidelines as part of training for new employees. I got an improved and 
good model fit with all factor loadings over 0,63, chi-square = 2,22 and df = 4, 
p-value = 0,695, RMSEA = 0. 
 
The model for term specification and writing (SKCC) provided me with some 
challenges. When measuring a construct with 8 items, it is difficult to obtain a 
good model fit. Based on correlations between some of the items, I decided to 
divide the term specification and writing construct into the sub-constructs skcc1, 
skcc2 and skcc3 to run the analysis. The items regarding specification of 
payment and delivery terms, cc15 and cc16, were linked to skcc2. The same 
procedure was conducted for the items regarding monitoring and mediation, 
cc18 and cc19. They were related to skcc3. The rest of the items are linked to 
skcc1. All factor loadings are above 0,69, chi-square = 26,77, df = 17, p-value = 
0,06156 and RMSEA = 0,088. The model fit is satisfactory.  
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The contract adaptation measurement model (ADCC) was subject to the same 
challenges as described above. Again, I had to separate the items into two 
constructs. Adcc1 represents c6, cc7, cc8 and cc9, regarding customer specific 
factors. Adcc2 represents cc10, cc11 and cc12, regarding risk and legal matters. 
All factors loaded above 0,83, with chi-square = 21,82, df = 13, p-value = 
0,05817 and RMSEA = 0,095. Despite high RMSEA all items were kept.  
 
Internal organizing (FICC) had a chi-square = 1,10, df = 2, p-value = 0,57738 
and RMSEA = 0, which indicates a good model fit. The lowest factor loading 
was 0,51 for cc2, which is related to conducting financial analyses to evaluate 
profitability of transactions and customer relationships. This is borderline the 
suggested standard as discussed in the introduction of chapter 4.10. I still 
decided to keep this item because 0,51 is above the general rule of 0,5 I follow 
in this thesis. 
 
The relationship development and maintenance (RECC) model had some 
suggested modification indices. I opened for correlation between item cc22 and 
cc23, as they can be perceived to measure the same practice of adjusting to 
cultural differences. All factor loadings were over 0,74, chi-square = 1,76, df = 
1, p-value = 0,18433 and RMSEA = 0,101. This represents satisfactory model 
fit. 
 
When I ran the measurement model for economic export performance (EPER), 
many modification indices were suggested. An attempt to open for all 
correlations would give a negative degree of freedom, and affect the quality of 
the model. I only opened for correlations between eper3 and eper4. This was 
justified based on the question contents. The new model fit had 0,63 as the 
lowest factor loading for eper3 on profitability. The model had a chi-square of = 
2,02, df = 1, p-value = 0,15493, and RMSEA = 0,117. Except the high RMSEA, 
the model fit was good.  
 
The measurement model for customer export performance (CPER) had very 
good factor loadings over 0,81, chi-square = 4,86, df = 2 and p-value = 0,08815. 
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The RMSEA was higher than satisfactory level at 0,138, but otherwise a good 
model fit.  
 
Based on the evaluations of the measurement models described (Appendix 5), all 
items were kept with the exception of res1. 
 
 4.10.3. Two-Factor Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
I tested the latent variables against each other to check for cross-loadings and to 
evaluate model fit. Cross-loadings occur when a variable have more than one 
significant loading (Hair Jr. et al. 2010). Table 4.17 shows the correlations 
between the constructs. 
Table 4.17: Correlation matrix between constructs 
 
 RES EXP TRAIN SKCC ADCC FICC RECC EPER CPER 
Resource slack (RES) 1         
Experience (EXP) -0,25 1        
Training (TRAIN) -0,27 0,69 1       
Term specification and writing 
(SKCC) N/A N/A N/A 1      
Contract adaptation (ADCC) N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A 1     
Internal organizing (FICC) -0,12 0,58 0,43 N/A N/A  1    
Relationship development and 
maintenance (RECC) 0,07 0,29 0,20 N/A N/A  0,5 1   
Economic export performance 
(EPER) -0,14 0,29 0,29 N/A N/A  0,43 0,24 1  
Customer export performance 
(CPER) 0,01 0,10 0,28 N/A N/A  0,52 0,40 0,58 1 
 
From table 4.17 I see that the correlations differ across various constructs. The 
highest correlations are found between the experience and training constructs 
(0,69). The two performance measures economic export performance (EPER) 
and customer export performance (CPER) also have a high correlation (0,58).  
 
As discussed in chapter 4.10.2, I experienced problems when measuring term 
specification and writing (SKCC) and contract adaptation (ADCC). This entails 
that I was unable to perform two-factor CFA of these constructs. These two 
constructs are therefore noted as not available (N/A) in table 4.17. Since, skcc1-
skcc3 all reflects the same dimension term specification and writing (SKCC) 
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they are merged for the regression analysis. This was also done for adcc1 and 
adcc2, which is merged as contract adaptation (ADCC) for the regressions. 
 
An overview of the characteristics of the different fit indices for the two-factor 
confirmatory factor analysis is shown in appendix 6. The overview shows chi-
square, degrees of freedom (df), p-value, RMSEA and comparative fit index 
(CFI). These indices can be used to evaluate if one model is better than another 
model (Hair Jr. et al. 2010) . 
 
When a model has less than 12 variables, CFI should be 0,97 or higher (Hair Jr. 
et al. 2010, 672). This applies to all my models. From appendix 6 I see that the 
experience and relationship development and maintenance model has a CFI 
value of 0,96. This indicates that one model have a poorer fit than the others. 
Due to the already discussed difficulties in running the two-factor confirmatory 
factor analysis on term specification and writing (SKCC) and contract 
adaptation (ADCC), I have noted N/A for these constructs in the fit indices table 
in appendix 6. 
 
To summarize I found that the two constructs experience and training might be 
correlated. Further, the two-factor confirmatory factor analysis shows that the 
model for experience and relationship development and maintenance perform 
worse than the other models. 
 
 4.10.4. Convergent Validity and Reliability 
Validity refers to the degree a measure accurately represents the concept 
intended to measure, and is necessary in order to be able to draw conclusions 
from research (Hair Jr. et al. 2010). Convergent validity refers to the “extent to 
which indicators of a specific construct converge or share a high proportion of 
variance in common” (Hair Jr. et al. 2010, 689). Convergent validity is therefore 
used to test to what extent measures of the same concept are correlated.  
 
In order to make conclusions about convergent validity, I calculated average 
variance extracted (AVE) and construct reliability (CR), as shown in table 4.18. 
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If results show high AVE and CR values, in addition to high factor loadings, it 
indicates convergent validity.  
 
Table 4.18: Convergent validity with AVE and construct reliability scores 
 
 SC SC Squared SE AVE CR 
Resource slack 2,16 1,613 1,39 0,54 0,77 
Experience 2,04 1,439 1,57 0,48 0,73 
Training 3,83 2,973 2,01 0,59 0,88 
Term specification and writing 6,62 5,546 2,42 0,69 0,95 
Contract adaptation 6,07 5,269 1,74 0,75 0,95 
Internal organizing 3,01 2,406 1,60 0,60 0,85 
Relationship development and maintenance 3,21 2,593 1,39 0,65 0,88 
Economic export performance 3,26 2,718 1,28 0,68 0,89 
Customer export performance 3,44 2,962 1,03 0,74 0,92 
 
AVE is a scale that measures the proportion of variance explained by the latent 
factor structure. (Hair Jr. et al. 2010, 709) It is desired to have an AVE of 0,5 or 
higher. In table 4.18 I see that most values are good and above 0,5, indicating 
that variance is sufficiently explained by the latent factor structure imposed on 
the measure. The only exception is the experience (EXP) construct with an AVE 
value of 0,48.  
 
Construct reliability (CR) indicates internal consistency and that the measures 
consistently represent the same latent construct. Values above 0,7 suggest good 
reliability, and values between 0,6 and 0,7 may be acceptable if other construct 
validity measures are good (Hair Jr. et al. 2010, 710). All my CR scores indicate 
very good construct reliability, in which the lowest value is 0,73. This is still 
with a margin above required level.  
 
Finally, I checked all the factor loadings from the single-factor CFA to see if 
they have satisfactory values (appendix 5). The value of 0,51 for item cc2 in the 
internal organizing model was low, indicating that other factors can influence 
this item. The question asked is: “compared to what you believe is normal 
among your closest competitors, how well is your capacity/competence to 
perform financial analyses to evaluate profitability of transactions and customer 
relationships?” I can see why this item have a higher error than the rest, based on 
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the rational that firms conduct financial analyses for a number of reasons. The 
exp1 item in the experience model also had a low factor loading at 0,51. The 
question asked is “we have long experience in using formal, written contracts.” 
This question may be perceived as relative and difficult to answer.  
 
The low factor loadings for internal organizing and experience are supported by 
the AVE and CR values. Internal organizing has an AVE value of 0,6 and CR 
0,85 which is amongst the lowest in the test. Experience performs even worse in 
this test, with AVE 0,48 and CR 0,73 as the lowest scores amongst the 
constructs. 
 
In conclusion, the overall assessment of AVE, construct reliability and factor 
loadings all shows satisfactory values. This indicates that convergent validity 
and reliability is present.  
 
 4.10.5. Evaluating Undimensionality 
Undimensionality exists when “a set of measured variables (indicators) can be 
explained by only one underlying construct” (Hair Jr. et al. 2010, 696). 
Undimensionality becomes especially important when more than two constructs 
are involved in a model (Hair Jr. et al. 2010). Accomplishing this is important, 
because a lack of undimensionality can lead to misinterpretation of the model. It 
might also indicate that the items are not related to the appropriate construct.  
 
I applied the single-factor measurement models (appendix 5) to evaluate 
undimensionality for the constructs. The results are presented in table 4.19. 
 
Table 4.19: Undimensionality 
 
Resource slack  
Experience  
Training  
Term specification and writing  
Contract adaptation  
Internal organizing  
Relationship development and maintenance  
Economic export performance  
Customer export performance  
Undimensionality 
Undimensionality 
Undimensionality 
*Weak Undimensionality 
*Weak Undimensionality 
*Weak Undimensionality 
*Weak Undimensionality 
Undimensionality 
Undimensionality 
 * Weak undimensionality means that the items capture different dimensions of the construct. 
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4.10.6. Discriminant Validity 
Discriminant validity is “the extent to which a construct is truly distinct from 
other constructs” (Hair Jr. et al. 2010, 710). This is important to determine since 
many of my constructs are closely related. The contracting capability construct 
is of special importance. This construct is a new concept and evidence 
supporting this as a unique phenomenon is lacking. 
 
To evaluate discriminant validity I calculated AVE values for each construct 
(table 4.18). Further, I squared the correlation estimates between all constructs, 
based on output from the two-factor CFA in table 4.17. The latter shows how 
much variance two constructs share. Finally, I compared the AVE values with 
the squared correlation estimates as presented in table 4.20. When the AVE 
values are higher than the squared correlations, good evidence is provided to 
conclude that discriminant validity is present (Hair Jr. et al. 2010, 710). I see that 
discriminant validity is present in all constructs.  
 
Table 4.20: Squared cross correlations between variables and AVE for each 
construct 
 
 RES EXP TRAIN SKCC ADCC FICC RECC EPER CPER 
Resource slack (RES) 0,5377*         
Experience (EXP) -0,0625 0,4797*        
Training (TRAIN) -0,0729 0,4761 0,5946*       
Terms specification 
and writing (SKCC) N/A N/A N/A 0,6933*      
Contract adaptation 
(ADCC) N/A N/A N/A N/A 0,7527*     
Internal organizing 
(FICC) -0.0144 0,3364 0,1849 N/A N/A 0,6015*    
Relationship 
development and 
maintenance (RECC) 0,0049 0,0841 0,0400 N/A N/A 0,2500 0,6483*   
Economic export 
performance (EPER) -0.0196 0,0841 0,0841 N/A N/A 0,1849 0,0576 0,6795*  
Customer export 
performance (CPER) 0,0001 0,0100 0,0784 N/A N/A 0,2704 0,1600 0,3364 0,7407* 
*AVE in italics 
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4.11. Descriptive Statistics 
I ran descriptive statistics for all constructs to give an overview of the responses 
to the survey (table 4.21). All items are measured on a 1-7 point Likert Scale. 
For some questions respondents did not use all response options. The minimum 
and maximum value for these items are therefore e.g. 3 and 7. The item removed 
during the single-factor confirmatory factor analyses (res1) is not listed.  
 
Skewness is used to measure the symmetry or balance of the distribution, and 
will be compared to the normal distribution. Skewness values falling outside the 
-1 and +1 range indicate a substantial skewed distribution (Hair Jr. et al. 2010). 
Almost all my values fall into this range, which entails that the distribution is 
balanced. The only exception is the value for exp1, which is -1.170 and skewed 
(table 4.21). This item may departure from normality because of the small 
sample size, which can increase measurement errors (Hair Jr. et al. 2010).  
 
Kurtosis measures the peakedness of a distribution compared to a normal 
distribution. (Hair Jr. et al. 2010, 35) A positive value indicates a relatively 
peaked distribution and a negative value indicates a flat distribution Kurtosis 
values show that most of the items are relatively flat distributed, as they are 
negative. However, some values are positive and indicate a peaked distribution: 
exp1, cc2, cc19, eper3 and eper4. 
 
In conclusion, the descriptive statistics show that most values have a balanced 
distribution with a few exceptions. 
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Table 4.21: Descriptive statistics 
 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Skewness              Kurtosis 
res2 1 7 2.66 1.732 .864 -.206 
res3 1 7 3.83 1.799 -.202 -1.189 
res4 1 7 3.33 1.742 .083 -1.287 
exp1 2 7 6.05 1.210 -1.170 .813 
exp2 1 7 4.76 1.683 -.361 -.522 
exp3 1 7 4.35 1.640 -.126 -.793 
train1 1 7 4.14 1.787 -.065 -1.119 
train2 1 7 3.34 1.571 .406 -.417 
train3 1 7 3.14 1.749 .356 -.898 
train4 1 7 3.11 1.596 .328 -.602 
train5 1 7 3.21 1.577 .354 -.589 
cc1 2 7 4.43 1.050 -.034 -.059 
cc2 1 7 4.50 1.260 -.288 .541 
cc3 2 7 4.63 1.118 .307 -.453 
cc4 2 7 4.78 1.196 .062 -.822 
cc5 2 7 4.74 1.124 .021 -.711 
cc6 2 7 4.68 1.086 .280 -.345 
cc7 2 7 4.58 1.169 .062 -.213 
cc8 3 7 4.84 1.071 -.077 -1.034 
cc9 2 7 4.71 1.187 -.053 -.569 
cc10 1 7 4.17 1.380 .122 .064 
cc11 2 7 4.58 1.192 .147 -.553 
cc12 2 7 4.57 1.193 .179 -.210 
cc13 3 7 5.21 1.062 .112 -.843 
cc14 3 7 5.07 1.170 .228 -1.017 
cc15 3 7 5.33 1.201 .093 -1.408 
cc16 2 7 5.28 1.271 .020 -1.156 
cc17 2 7 4.91 1.224 -.089 -.608 
cc18 2 7 4.59 1.157 .009 -.314 
cc19 2 7 4.59 .955 .532 .525 
cc20 3 7 5.36 1.111 -.031 -.957 
cc21 2 7 5.29 1.164 -.279 -.500 
cc22 2 7 4.93 1.075 -.329 -.086 
cc23 2 7 4.95 1.142 -.336 .077 
eper1 2 7 4.35 1.175 -.048 -.277 
eper2 2 7 4.46 1.173 .074 -.343 
eper3 1 7 4.58 1.166 -.025 .485 
eper4 2 7 4.58 1.007 .599 .455 
cper1 3 7 5.00 .980 .524 -.491 
cper2 3 7 5.12 .993 -.075 -.637 
cper3 2 7 4.96 1.076 -.052 -.396 
cper4 3 7 5.12 .952 .044 -.977 
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5. Analysis and Results 
Regression analysis was conducted to test the hypotheses. It is a “statistical 
technique used to analyze the relationship between a single dependent variable 
and several independent variables” (Hair Jr. et al. 2010, 155). This helps me 
determine the likelihood and probability of my inferences, and make more 
accurate conclusions about the relationships suggested in the research model 
(George and Mallery 2011).  
 
I applied IBM SPSS Statistics 20 to perform the regression analysis. Based on 
the factor loadings in the single-factor measurement models, I made new 
variables in SPSS: resource slack, experience, training, contracting capabilities, 
term specification and writing, contract adaptation, internal organizing, 
relationships development and maintenance, economic export performance and 
customer export performance.  
 
Also, some variables are included that I was not able to test by the use of 
measurement models. These variables are: age of firm, size of firm, internal 
consult and external consult. The confidence interval is set at 0,95 %. I apply 
Adjusted R Square as an indicator of how much variance is explained by the 
regression equation and an indication of fit between dependent and independent 
variables (Green and Salkind 2011). 
 
In this chapter I have decided to make a distinction between economic export 
performance (EPER) and customer export performance (CPER) as dependent 
variables. This is done to be able to make statistical valid conclusions about 
financial, as well as relationship performance. They are presented separately in 
chapter 5.2 and 5.3.  
 
Further, I want to check the individual impact of the dimensions in the 
contracting capabilities construct on economic export performance and customer 
export performance. Term specification and writing, contract adaptation, internal 
organizing, and relationship development and maintenance are therefore 
included as separate independent variables in the last two regressions.  
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The hypotheses presented in chapter 3 are repeated in table 5.1. 
 
Table 5.1: Hypotheses 
 
H1a: The more company resources available for export activities, the higher the level of contracting capabilities. 
  
H1b: 
 
The more experience in negotiating, writing and using contracts, the higher the level of contracting 
capabilities. 
 
H1c: The older the age of firm, the higher the level of contracting capabilities. 
 
H1d: The larger the firm size, the higher the level of contracting capabilities. 
 
H1e: 
 
The higher degree of internal consult applied in contracting activities, the higher the level of contracting 
capabilities. 
 
H1f: 
 
The higher degree of external consult applied in contracting activities, the higher the level of contracting 
capabilities. 
 
H1g: 
 
The higher the degree of employee training in contractual work, the higher the level of contracting 
capabilities. 
 
H2a: The higher the level of contracting capabilities, the higher is economic firm performance. 
 
H2b: The higher the level of contracting capabilities, the higher is relationship firm performance. 
 
 
 
5.1. Model Estimation of Contracting Capabilities as the 
Dependent Variable 
I ran regression analysis to assess the effects firm characteristics have on 
contracting capabilities. Resource slack, experience, age of firm, size of firm, 
internal consult, external consult and training are the independent variables. 
Contracting capabilities is the dependent variable. This allows me to test 
hypotheses H1a, H1b, H1c, H1d, H1e, H1f, and H1g. The regression can be 
stated as follows:  
 
Contracting Capabilities = a0 + a1 x resource slack + a2 x experience + a3 x 
age of firm + a4 x size of firm + a5 x internal consult + a6 x external consult + 
a7 x training + e 
 
From table 5.2 I see that the value under revision, the Adjusted R Square is 
0,263. This means that 26,3 % of the variation in the dependent variable is 
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explained by the independent variables (Hair Jr. et al. 2010). This suggests that 
other factors not included in the model might have an impact on the dependent 
variable. 
Table 5.2: Model summary. Contracting capabilities as dependent variable. 
 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .576a .332 .263 16.59319 
a. Predictors: (Constant), resource slack, experience, age of firm, size of firm, internal 
consult, external consult, training 
b. Dependent Variable: contracting capabilities 
 
From the ANOVA table (table 5.3), I can see that the regression is statistically 
significant with p-value = 0, at 0,05 significance level. 
 
Table 5.3: ANOVA. Contracting capabilities as dependent variable. 
 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 9305.711 7 1329.387 4.828 .000b 
Residual 18722.710 68 275.334   
Total 28028.421 75    
a. Dependent Variable: contracting capabilities 
 b. Predictors: (Constant), resource slack, experience, age of firm, size of firm, internal consult, 
external consult, training 
 
5.1.1. Hypotheses 
I now evaluate the independent variables measuring characteristics of firms 
based on the coefficient table. It allows me to see the variables combined, and 
thus test the hypotheses associated. 
 
Table 5.4: Coefficients. Contracting capabilities as dependent variable. 
 
Model Unstandardized  
Coefficients 
Std. 
Coefficients 
 
 
t 
 
 
Significance 
 
Collinarity Statistics 
 B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) 80.321 10.200  7.875 .000   
Resource slack -.458 .471 -.103 -.972 .334 .881 1.135 
Experience 1.914 .670 .361 2.858 .006 .617 1.622 
Age of firm -.108 .066 -.176 -1.645 .105 .859 1.164 
Size of firm .000 .001 .048 .410 .683 .726 1.378 
Internal consult .509 .602 .093 .845 .401 .819 1.221 
External consult 1.156 .899 .132 1.286 .203 .931 1.074 
Training .511 .350 .181 1.461 .149 .638 1.567 
a. Dependent Variable: contracting capabilities 
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From table 5.4 I see that only one of the independent variables is significant on 
the level of contracting capabilities, namely experience (0,006 < 0,05). The 
relationship is positive. Hypothesis H1b is thus supported. The beta value for 
standardized coefficients of experience (0,361) is the largest contribution in 
explaining contracting capabilities. 
 
From the coefficients table (table 5.4) I see that none of the following variables 
are significant in explaining contracting capabilities: resource slack (0,334 > 
0,05), age of firm (0,105 > 0,05), size of firm (0,683 > 0,05), internal consult 
(0,401 > 0,05), external consult (0,203 > 0,05) or training (0,149 > 0,05) This 
means that hypotheses H1a, H1c, H1d, H1e, H1f and H1g are not supported. 
 
The following regression equation is made based on the beta values for 
unstandardized coefficients: 
 
Contracting Capabilities = 80,321 - 0,458 x resource slack + 1,914 x 
experience - 0,108 x age of firm + 0 x size of firm +0,509 x internal consult + 
1,156 x external consult + 0,511 x training 
 
For the significant variable, the regression equation shows that by increasing 
experience with 1, contracting capabilities increase with 1,914.  
 
 5.1.2. Multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity is an expression of the relationship between more than two 
independent variables (Hair Jr. et al. 2010, 156). It is used to improve prediction 
of the dependent variable. “To maximize prediction from a given number of 
independent variables, the researches should look for independent variables that 
have low multicollinearity with the other independent variables but also have 
high correlations with the dependent variable” (Hair Jr. et al. 2010, 166). 
 
Based on the correlations table (table 5.5), I checked whether the independent 
variables in my model had relationships with other independent variables. This 
was not detected. When I looked at the correlations between the independent 
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variables and the dependent variable I saw that experience (0,497) shows the 
highest correlation with contracting capabilities. The variable showing the 
lowest correlation is resource slack.  
 
Further, collineary diagnostics with tolerance values and variance inflation 
factors (VIF) were analyzed to see whether multicollinearity was present. 
Multicollineraity is not present if tolerance values are above 0,10 and VIF values 
below 10 (Hair Jr. et al. 2010). I see from table 5.4 that all the tolerance values 
are above required level and the VIF values satisfactory low. Hence, I conclude 
that multicollinearity is not present.   
 
Table 5.5: Correlations. Contracting capabilities as dependent variable. 
 
 Contracting capabilities 
Resource 
slack 
Experience Age 
of firm 
Size 
of firm 
Internal 
consult 
External 
consult 
Training 
Contracting capabilities 1.000        
Resource slack -.020 1.000       
Experience .497 .195 1.000      
Age of firm -.177 .200 -.033 1.000     
Size of firm .124 .160 .248 .249 1.000    
Internal consult .181 -.086 .145 -.011 .379 1.000   
External consult .219 .053 .173 -.044 -.108 -.070 1.000  
Training .376 .226 .563 .143 .145 .088 .187 1.000 
 
5.2. Model Estimation of Economic Export Performance as the 
Dependent Variable 
I estimated the model where the dependent variable was economic export 
performance and the independent variables were the contracting capabilities 
dimensions: term specification and writing, contract adaption, internal 
organizing, and relationship development and maintenance. This estimation 
enabled me to test hypothesis H2a. The regression can be stated as follows: 
 
Economic Export Performance = a0 + a1 x term specification and writing + a2 
x contract adaptation + a3 x internal organizing + a4 x relationship 
development and maintenance + e 
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The model summary (table 5.6) shows that the adjusted R2 is 0,176. This means 
that the independent variable explains 17,6% of the total variance in economic 
export performance. This percentage is not very high, but it seems logic that 
economic export performance is influenced by a number of factors, not just 
contracting capabilities.  
Table 5.6: Model summary. Economic export performance as dependent 
variable. 
 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .469a .220 .176 3.57330 
a. Predictors: (Constant), term specification and writing, contract adaptation, internal 
organizing, relationship development and maintenance 
b. Dependent Variable: economic export performance 
 
From the ANOVA table below (table 5.7), I see that the regression is statistically 
significant with p-value = 0,001, at the 0,05 significance level. 
Table 5.7: ANOVA. Economic export performance as dependent variable. 
 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 255.794 4 63.949 5.008 .001b 
Residual 906.561 71 12.768   
Total 1162,355 75    
a. Dependent Variable: economic export performance 
 b. Predictors: (Constant), term specification and writing, contract adaptation, internal 
organizing, relationship development and maintenance 
 
5.2.1. Hypotheses 
I follow the same procedure as in chapter 5.1.1 and evaluate the effects of each 
of the independent variables in the model. This is shown in the coefficients table 
(table 5.8). 
 
Table 5.8: Coefficients. Economic export performance as dependent variable.  
 
Model Unstandardized  
Coefficients 
Std. 
Coefficients 
 
 
t 
 
 
Significance 
Collinarity 
Statistics 
 B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) 8.323 2.506  3.322 .001   
Term specification and writing -.061 .090 -.118 -.681 .498 .364 2.751 
Contract adaptation -.086 .101 -.157 -.855 .396 .327 3.055 
Internal organizing .506 .179 .487 2.828 .006 .371 2.699 
Relationship development and 
maintenance .266 .138 .268 1.933 .057 .572 1.747 
a. Dependent Variable: economic export performance 
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I see that one variable has a significant influence on the dependent variable 
economic export performance; internal organizing (0,006 < 0,05). This indicates 
that internal organizing related to contractual work has a positive relationship 
with firm performance. The other three dimensions of contracting capabilities 
show insignificant values. Hence, hypothesis H2a is partially supported. I also 
see that internal organizing provides the largest contribution in explaining 
economic export performance (0,487). 
 
The coefficients table also shows that none of following variables are significant 
in explaining economic firm performance: term specification and writing (0,498 
> 0,05), contract adaptation (0,396 > 0,05) or relationship development and 
maintenance (0,057 > 0,05). 
 
The following regression equation is made based on the beta values for 
unstandardized coefficients: 
 
Economic Export Performance = 8,323 – 0.061 x term specification and 
writing – 0,086 x contract adaptation + 0,506 x internal organizing + 0,266 x 
relationship development and maintenance + e 
 
For the significant variable, the regression equation shows that by increasing 
internal organizing by 1, economic export performance increases by 0,506. 
 
 5.2.2. Multicollinearity 
From the correlations table below (table 5.9), I see that all tolerance values are 
above 0,10 and all VIF values below 10. I also see that internal organizing 
shows the highest correlation with the dependent variable economic export 
performance. 
 
Further, the results show that some of the contracting capabilities dimensions 
have high correlations between each other (0,650 – 0,779). Because of the high 
correlations between these dimensions I am concerned that multicollinearity 
might be an issue. However, these variables all measure dimensions of the same 
construct and assumed to be correlated. The option of measuring all contracting 
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capabilities items together and not as four independent variables would not cause 
this problem, but then again I would not be able to determine their individual 
significance.  
Table 5.9: Correlations. Economic export performance as dependent variable. 
 
 
Economic 
export 
performance 
Term 
specification 
and writing 
Contract 
adaptation 
Internal 
organizing 
Relationship 
development 
and 
maintenance 
Economic export performance 1.000     
Term specification and writing  .263 1.000    
Contract adaptation  .265 .701 1.000   
Internal organizing .412 .650 .779 1.000  
Relationship development and 
maintenance .343 .652 .467 .463 1.000 
 
5.3. Model Estimation of Customer Export Performance as the 
Dependent Variable 
I estimated the final model where the dependent variable was customer export 
performance and the independent variables were the contracting capabilities 
dimensions: term specification and writing, contract adaption, internal 
organizing, and relationship development and maintenance. This enables me to 
test hypothesis H2b. The regression can be stated as follows:  
 
Customer Export Performance = a0 + a1 x term specification and writing + a2 
x contract adaptation + a3 x internal organizing + a4 x relationship 
development and maintenance + e 
 
The model summary (table 5.10) shows that the adjusted R2 is 0,220. This means 
that the independent variables explain 22 % of the total variance in customer 
export performance.  
Table 5.10: Model summary. Customer export performance as dependent 
variable. 
 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .512a .262 .220 3.16950 
a. Predictors: (Constant), term specification and writing, contract adaptation, internal 
organizing, relationship development and maintenance 
b. Dependent Variable: customer export performance 
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From the ANOVA table (table 5.11), I see that the regression is statistically 
significant with p-value = 0, at the 0,05 significance level.  
Table 5.11: ANOVA. Customer export performance as dependent variable. 
 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 252.792 4 63.198 6.291 .000b 
Residual 713.247 71 10.046   
Total 966.039 75    
a. Dependent Variable: customer export performance 
 b. Predictors: (Constant), term specification and writing, contract adaptation, internal 
organizing, relationship development and maintenance 
 
5.3.1. Hypotheses 
I follow the same procedure in chapter 5.1.1 and evaluate the effects of the 
independent variables in the model. This is shown in the coefficients table below 
(table 5.12) and enables me to test the last hypothesis.  
Table 5.12: Coefficients. Customer export performance as dependent variable.  
 
Model Unstandardized  
Coefficients 
Std. 
Coefficients 
 
 
t 
 
 
Significance 
Collinarity 
Statistics 
 B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) 10.169 2.223  4.576 .000   
Term specification and writing -.029 .080 -.060 -.357 .722 .364 2.751 
Contract adaptation -.061 .090 -.121 -.678 .500 .327 3.055 
Internal organizing .462 .159 .488 2.913 .005 .371 2.699 
Relationship development and 
maintenance .223 .122 .247 1.831 .071 .572 1.747 
a. Dependent Variable: customer export performance 
 
From the coefficients table (table 5.12), I see that only one independent variable 
is statistically significant on the dependent variable customer export 
performance, namely internal organizing (0,005 < 0,05). Internal organizing in 
contractual work has a positive relationship with customer export performance, 
hence hypothesis H2b is partially supported. Looking at the Beta column in 
standardized coefficients, I also see that internal organizing make the largest 
contribution in explaining customer export performance (0,488).  
 
The coefficients table also shows that none of the following variables are 
significant in explaining relationship firm performance: term specification and 
writing (0,722 > 0,05), contract adaptation (0,5 > 0,05) or relationship 
development and maintenance (0,071 > 0,05).  
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The following regression equation is made based on the beta values for 
unstandardized coefficients: 
 
Customer Export Performance = 10,169 – 0.029 x term specification and 
writing – 0,061 x contract adaptation + 0,462 x internal organizing + 0,223 x 
relationship development and maintenance + e 
 
For the significant variable, the regression equation shows that by increasing 
internal organizing by 1, customer export performance will increase by 0,462. 
 
 5.3.2. Multicollinearity 
Since the same independent variables are applied for the regression in chapter 
5.3 as in chapter 5.2, the correlations between them are the same (table 5.13). 
Thus, the high correlations between the contracting capabilities dimensions are 
still an issue. However, as explained in chapter 5.2.2 they are highly correlated 
because they measure the same construct.  
 
Again I see that internal organizing has the highest correlation with the 
dependent variable customer export performance (0,469). The tolerance and VIF 
values fit the criteria.  
Table 5.13: Correlations. Customer export performance as dependent variable  
 
 
Customer 
export 
performance 
Term 
specification and 
writing 
Contract 
adaptation 
Internal 
organizing 
Relationship 
development and 
maintenance 
Customer export performance 1.000     
Term specification and writing .333 1.000    
Contract adaptation .332 .701 1.000   
Internal organizing .469 .650 .779 1.000  
Relationship development and 
maintenance .377 .652 .467 .463 1.000 
 
Table 5.14 summarizes the results from chapter 5. The table provides an 
overview of which of the hypotheses that are supported by the empirical data 
and which that are not supported 
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Table 5.14: Results of hypotheses 
 
H1a: 
 
The more company resources available for export activities, the higher the level of 
contracting capabilities. 
 
Not Supported 
H1b: 
 
The more experience in negotiating, writing and using contracts, the higher the level 
of contracting capabilities. 
 
Supported 
H1c: The older the age of firm, the higher the level of contracting capabilities. 
 
Not Supported 
H1d: The larger the firm size, the higher the level of contracting capabilities. 
 
Not Supported 
H1e: 
 
The higher degree of internal consult applied in contracting activities, the higher the 
level of contracting capabilities. 
 
Not Supported 
H1f: 
 
The higher degree of external consult applied in contracting activities, the higher the 
level of contracting capabilities. 
 
Not Supported 
H1g: 
 
The higher the degree of employee training in contractual work, the higher the level 
of contracting capabilities. 
Not Supported 
   
H2a: The higher the level of contracting capabilities, the higher is economic firm 
performance. 
Partially Supported 
 
H2b: The higher the level of contracting capabilities, the higher is relationship firm 
performance. 
 
Partially Supported 
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6. Discussion 
As an extension to prior research on formal contracts, this thesis investigates 
how firms use contracts in their business. In this chapter, the results from the 
empirical study are discussed, and concise answers to the four research questions 
presented in chapter 1.1 are given. Finally, theoretical contributions and 
managerial implications are discussed.  
 
6.1. Summary of Findings 
In this section the results from the study are presented and answers to research 
questions discussed. This is supplemented with findings from the qualitative 
interviews in chapter 4.2.3. 
 
In this thesis I investigate contracting capabilities from the sellers’ perspective of 
the buyer-seller dyad. The results should therefore be interpreted accordingly, 
because the buyers´ perspective might be different.  
 
My first research question was to determine how contracting capabilities could 
be measured. The empirical analysis indicates that contracting capabilities can 
be measured with 23 different items. These items can be divided into four 
dimensions; (1) term specification and writing; (2) contracting adaptation; (3) 
internal organizing; and (4) relationship development and maintenance. For a 
full list of the items according to dimensions see table 4.3 - 4.6. The informants 
in the qualitative interviews support that these 23 items may be used to measure 
ability and capacity to perform tasks related to the contracting process.  
 
In the measurement evaluation chapter (chapter 4.10) I found that the tests I was 
able to conduct on the contracting capabilities measures were satisfactory with 
regards to model fit, validity and reliability.  
 
My second research question was to determine how contracting capabilities 
could be developed. This question can be directly linked to the first research 
question where it was determined how contracting capabilities can be measured 
and what activities the construct involves. It can be argued that to develop 
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contracting capabilities, firms need to develop their ability and capacity to 
perform the 23 activities defined as the answer to the first research question. 
Also as suggested in the next section for the third research question, firms can 
develop contracting capabilities as they gain experience.  
 
My third research question was to determine if there are firm characteristics 
positively related to contracting capabilities. In chapter 3.1 it is argued that firm 
characteristics associated with higher contracting capabilities are: resources, 
experience, higher age of firm, larger size of firm, internal consult, external 
consult, and training procedures. Being in possession of these characteristics can 
provide higher ability and capacity to conduct contractual processes within 
organizations.  
 
I find that companies with more experience from contractual work and formal 
contracts have higher contracting capabilities than companies without this 
experience. This indicates that contracting capabilities develop as firms learn 
from previous mistakes and engage in more contractual relationships.  
 
I do not receive support for the propositions that the following firm 
characteristics have an impact on contracting capabilities: resources, age of firm, 
size of firm, internal consult, external consult and training. 
 
My fourth research question was to determine if contracting capabilities are 
positively associated with firm performance. The empirical analysis shows that 
one of the contracting capabilities dimensions, internal organizing, has 
significant impact on firm performance. Internal organizing is positively 
associated with both economic- and relationship firm performance.  
 
Internal organizing is measured with four items in the survey. Thus the items 
found to have a positive influence on firm performance are: internal delegation 
of roles and responsibilities during the contracting process, conducting financial 
analyses to evaluate profitability of transactions and relationships, understanding 
how contracts should be adapted to companies products, and understanding how 
contracts should be adapted to companies value chain and activities.  
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The qualitative interviews supports these internal organizing items as positively 
associated with firm performance. First, I found that there was no coincidence 
that the informants I spoke to were responsible for contracts with exchange 
partners in their respective companies. This was a careful choice based on their 
education, experience and status at the firm. This supports that companies 
delegate roles and responsibilities within their organization to enhance 
contractual performance. 
 
Secondly, the second informant stated that financial analyses were always 
conducted in their company to evaluate profitability of transactions and 
relationships.  
 
Finally, the informants from the last two interviews both argued that 
understanding of how contracts should be adapted to companies´ products, value 
chain and activities is an aspect of contracting capabilities with positive 
performance implications. As explicitly stated by one of the informants, 
companies need to know their own organization to succeed.  
 
The following dimensions of contracting capabilities show no statistical 
relationship with firm performance: term specification and writing, contract 
adaptation, and relationship development and maintenance. Thus, only one out 
of the four contracting capabilities dimensions shows a statistical significant 
relationship with firm performance.  
 
The four research questions collectively answers my problem statement: How 
can contracting capabilities be measured and developed, and how do they 
impact firm performance in B2B relationships? 
 
 
6.2. Theoretical Contributions 
In this chapter the theoretical background for my research questions are 
compared to my findings presented in chapter 6.1. The aim is to evaluate if my 
findings adds to-, supports- or contradicts previous research. This thesis provides 
four main theoretical contributions.  
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Existing research is limited considering the effects of contracting capabilities 
(Argyres and Mayer 2007). The area of measuring and developing contracting 
capabilities has received even less focus in contracting literature. Existing 
research has mainly focused on specification of contract terms as a way to 
enhance contractual performance (e.g. Mayer and Argyres 2004, Weber and 
Mayer 2005; Mooi and Ghosh 2010).  
 
Based on research by Argyres and Mayer (2007), I developed a research model 
where I first examined if seven defined firm characteristics have a positive 
influence on contracting capabilities. Thereafter I investigated the effects 
contracting capabilities have on firm performance. To my knowledge no 
research has examined contracting capabilities in the Norwegian industry, more 
specifically production of equipment and vehicles (chapter 4.4). This thesis 
therefore holds several important contributions and extends current contracting 
literature. The theoretical contributions of this thesis are elaborated in the next 
sections. 
 
A theoretical contribution is that prior research has focused on what firms need 
to be good at to succeed with formal contracts, abilities that can be translated 
into contracting capabilities (e.g. Argyres and Mayer 2007; Mayer and Argyres 
2004; Weber and Mayer 2005). I extend this line of research and developed item 
measures on how contracting capabilities can be measured.  
 
I also apply these items in a study to measure firms´ capabilities. My findings 
suggest that contracting capabilities can be measured with 23 items divided into 
four dimensions; term specification and writing, contract adaptation, internal 
organizing, and relationship development and maintenance.  
 
A second contribution is that Argyres and Mayer (2007) argue that contracting 
capabilities mainly relates to designing formal written contracts. My findings 
suggest that preparation and follow-up of formal contracts should be included as 
a part of the contracting capabilities measure as well. This supports Weber and 
Mayer´s (2005) view of contract negotiations as an important part of contracting 
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capabilities. Rigault´s (2010) view on contract enforcement as an important part 
of the contracting process also receives support.  
 
A third contribution is that I fill a gap in the literature by examining traits of 
firms to identify firm characteristics positively associated with contracting 
capabilities. My findings suggest that more experienced firms have higher 
contracting capabilities. This supports Mayer and Argyres´s (2004) view of 
contracting as a learning process, where firms develop their contracting skills as 
they engage in more contractual relationships and learn from previous mistakes.  
 
A fourth contribution is that I add to contracting literature by empirically 
investigating firm performance as a consequence of contracting capabilities. My 
findings suggest that firms with contracting capabilities related to internal 
organizing have higher performance. This supports Argyres and Mayer´s (2007) 
view of internal organizing and human resource allocation as a way to exploit 
capabilities and competencies in the organization for a competitive advantage.  
 
This thesis presents a way for firms to enhance their performance by developing 
their contracting capabilities. The results from the analysis show that internal 
organizing of activities related to contractual work positively influence firms´ 
performance, both economic- and relationship performance. If firms succeed 
with internal organizing of their activities in the contracting process, they can 
develop contracting capabilities and enhance performance.  
 
 
6.3. Managerial Implications 
The context of this thesis is highly relevant due to the present situation in 
international business. Norwegian industry is facing new requirements due to 
increased competition, and companies need to develop sustainable competitive 
advantages to perform in the market. Companies must therefore manage their 
exchange relationships in ways that extract the most value from contracts as well 
as relationships. 
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The results presented in this thesis have three main implications for managers. A 
managerial implication is that suppliers that apply formal contracts to their 
exchange relationships should aim to gain more experience with formal written 
contracts. Tenure with contracts is an advantage, but difficult to provoke. 
Gaining in-depth expertise on how to successfully perform activities related to 
contractual work can however be a manageable target for firms. 
 
Suppliers should ensure proficiency by learning from previous mistakes in 
contracts and relationships. Evaluation of contractual relationships and 
identification of best practices is therefore recommended. The results from the 
analysis show that competent employees with previous experience from 
contractual work are positively associated with contracting capabilities. 
 
A second implication is that companies can enhance their performance if they 
manage their internal organizing successfully during the contracting process. 
This management practice is a contracting capability with positive performance 
implications. 
 
Internal organizing is important because companies need to exploit the full 
potential of their staff when they negotiate, write and follow-up formal written 
contracts. Companies operate in competitive environments and deal with a 
number of contingencies that could affect their exchange relationships. Firms 
should therefore make sure that they are represented in best possible way when 
they engage in trading relationships to sustain a competitive advantage. 
 
Financial analysis is a part of internal organizing where the financial status of 
companies´ is evaluated before committing to contracts. Financial analyses can 
be conducted to evaluate the profitability of transactions in two ways. First, 
these analyses can be conducted to exclude unprofitable transactions and 
relationships. Secondly, financial analyses can identify projects with highest 
returns. Rating projects based on returns is important if companies have limited 
resources and need to choose among projects.  
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Suppliers should aim at adapting contract terms to their firm´s individual 
features. The features examined in this thesis are products, value chain and 
activities. Adapting contract terms to these features ensures that contracts are 
more suited to fit company needs.  
 
A third managerial implication relates to the applicability of contracting 
capabilities measures. The measurement scale is suitable as an evaluation 
criterion. This implies that companies can apply the scale to evaluate their 
performance along the contracting capabilities dimension. It enables companies 
to assess their strengths and weaknesses in contractual work. This is important 
because it facilitates the development of contracting capabilities. 
 
These findings should motivate managers to develop contracting capabilities, 
and by doing so strengthen their abilities and capacity to perform contracting 
activities. This might lead to a sustainable competitive advantage and enhanced 
performance.  
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7. Limitations and Future Research 
There are several limitations present in this thesis. My aim was to provide 
knowledge for future research in the area of contracting capabilities. To my 
knowledge, this thesis is the first to measure firms´ level of capabilities. The 
item measures for the contracting capabilities construct used in the study are 
therefore new. A limitation concerning this construct is that I did not conduct 
pre-tests for the new item measures used. Pre-test are also not conducted for the 
constructs experience or training. 
 
Another imperfection of my study is that one of the items measuring resource 
slack (res1) had to be removed due to poor performance in the measurement 
evaluation. All measures worked well, with the exception of term specification 
and writing (SKCC) and contract adaptability (ADCC). I occurred some 
difficulties with the confirmatory factor analysis due to the high number of items 
for the terms specification and writing, and contract adaptation constructs. As I 
was not able to control for cross correlations with other constructs or check for 
discriminant validity on these constructs, the conclusions concerning term 
specification and writing, and contract adaptation are not complete.  
 
Endogeneity was not taken into consideration so other factors than those 
measured here can influence the constructs. For instance, since all questions are 
framed based on firms´ perceptions of their abilities and capacities they can be 
based on different factors not controlled for in my thesis. An example is if firms 
have different perceptions of what the industry standard is they can over/under 
estimate their own performance.  
 
Another limitation in this thesis is that the findings and results from the 
regressions show support for relationships between the constructs, which 
performed worst in the methodology section. I received support for my 
proposition of experience as a positive influence on contracting capabilities. 
However, I also see that one of the items measuring experience is subject to a 
low factor loading and the construct as a whole has a low AVE. This indicates 
that a low proportion of variance is explained by the latent factor structure.  
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I also show concern for the multicollinearity issues between the dimensions of 
the contracting capabilities construct. Their high correlation values can be 
explained by the fact that they are set to measure the same construct, but still 
multicollinearity might be an issue. 
 
I only investigate the supplier side of the transaction relationships. Time and 
resource constraints limited my focus to the supplier´s side, and the supplier´s 
perception of the relationship. Therefore, the constructs relationship 
development and maintenance, and customer export performance have results 
based on the suppliers´ perception of the buyer, not the buyers´ own perceptions. 
This is a limitation. Future research should therefore aim to look at both sides to 
get more generalizable conclusions.   
 
All the results provided are context dependent hence I am not able to generalize 
the findings to other industries and countries. The results are therefore only 
generalizable to export firms operating in Norway within the industries of 
production of machinery and equipment for general use (NACE industry 28), 
production of motor vehicles and trailers (NACE industry 29), and production of 
other transport vehicles (NACE industry 30). It would be interesting to conduct 
this study in different industries and countries to see if the results provided here 
are applicable in different contexts. A larger sample of firms would also be of 
interest.  
 
Contracting capabilities are relevant for all companies when they trade and apply 
formal contracts to govern these transactions. Based on their significant 
implications for firms´ contractual performance, I argue that this topic needs 
further research and empirical testing. The construct is complicated, and may be 
subject to other relationships than the ones suggested in this thesis. The 
possibility that some of the contracting capabilities dimensions e.g. internal 
organizing, actually are antecedents to formal contracting should also be 
considered. Additional testing of item measures on contracting capabilities 
should be conducted, thus to further develop the measurement scale.  
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